Enfranchising the crowd: Nominee account equity crowdfunding

J. Coakley, Douglas J. Cumming, Aristogenis Lazos, S. Vismara
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

The nominee approach to equity crowdfunding pools all crowd investors into one (nominee) account where typically the platform acts as the legal owner but the crowd retains beneficial ownership. The platform plays an active digital corporate governance role that simultaneously enfranchises crowd investors with voting and ownership rights but removes the administrative burden on startups of having to deal with several hundred shareholders. Through an inter-platform and intra-platform analysis of a large sample of 1,018 initial equity crowdfunding campaigns, this paper assesses both the short-term and the long-term impact of nominee versus direct ownership. It finds that nominee initial campaigns are on average more successful than direct ownership campaigns in that they are more likely to succeed, raise more funds, attract overfunding and enjoy greater long run success in terms of successful seasoned equity crowdfunded offerings, numbers of such offerings, and probability of survival. These results hold inter-platform between the two main UK equity crowdfunding platforms (Seedrs and Crowdcube) as well as intra-platform, using the post-2015 quasi-natural experiment when the nominee approach became an option for startups raising capital on Crowdcube.
众筹:代名账户股权众筹
股权众筹的代名方式是将所有投资者集中到一个(代名)账户中,通常平台充当合法所有者,但众筹保留实益所有权。该平台扮演着积极的数字公司治理角色,在赋予大众投资者投票权和所有权的同时,还消除了初创公司必须与数百名股东打交道的行政负担。通过对1018个初始股权众筹活动的大样本进行平台间和平台内分析,本文评估了代持有人与直接所有者的短期和长期影响。研究发现,从成功的股权众筹产品、此类产品的数量和生存概率来看,提名人初始活动平均比直接所有权活动更成功,因为他们更有可能成功,筹集更多资金,吸引超额融资,并享有更大的长期成功。这些结果适用于两个主要的英国股权众筹平台(Seedrs和Crowdcube)之间的平台间以及平台内部,使用2015年后的准自然实验,当提名方式成为创业公司在Crowdcube上筹集资金的一种选择时。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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