Entrepreneur—A Jockey or a Horse Owner?

Elena Kulchina, Pernille Gjerløv-Juel
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

The business literature has long been concerned with understanding why people become entrepreneurs. This literature, however, has mixed together two important issues — founding a new business and being the right person to operate it. Up until recently, entrepreneurship scholars have largely believed that founders run their ventures personally. Yet it is not clear from either a theoretical or an empirical standpoint why this should be the case. Indeed, entrepreneurs are often criticized for having limited business expertise and placing personal motives ahead of financial returns. Whether founders are optimal managers for their firms strongly depends on their motives for operating the firm personally, i.e., whether their decision is driven by expected non-pecuniary benefits of management or by more strategic considerations. In our paper, we use fine-grained data on entrepreneurs in Denmark to examine what motivates them to operate their firms personally as opposed to hiring a manager. We find that while nonpecuniary motives play a role in the founders’ decision to operate their firms personally, opportunity cost of owner-management and relevant prior experience are equally important. Thus, entrepreneurs put significant emphasis on the characteristics that would improve firm performance and their overall wealth. Our findings are similar for entrepreneurs in high-technology and low-technology sectors as well as for founders who hire non-family and family managers. We also observe that when founders do not manage their firms personally, they typically work full-time at another firm or play a non-managing role in their own venture. In our subsequent analysis, we investigate how these two types of non-managing founders differ, providing further insights into their behavioral motives.
企业家——骑师还是马主?
长期以来,商业文献一直关注于理解人们为什么会成为企业家。然而,这些文献把两个重要问题混在了一起——创立一家新企业,以及成为经营这家企业的合适人选。直到最近,创业学者大多认为创始人亲自经营他们的企业。然而,从理论或经验的角度来看,为什么会出现这种情况都不清楚。事实上,企业家经常被批评缺乏商业专业知识,将个人动机置于经济回报之上。创始人是否是公司的最佳管理者在很大程度上取决于他们个人经营公司的动机,也就是说,他们的决定是由管理层预期的非金钱利益驱动,还是由更多的战略考虑驱动。在我们的论文中,我们使用了丹麦企业家的细粒度数据来研究是什么促使他们亲自经营自己的公司,而不是聘请经理。我们发现,虽然非金钱动机在创始人亲自经营公司的决定中发挥了作用,但所有者管理的机会成本和相关的先前经验同样重要。因此,企业家们非常重视能够提高公司绩效和整体财富的特征。对于高科技和低科技行业的企业家,以及聘用非家族和家族经理的创始人来说,我们的发现是相似的。我们还观察到,当创始人不亲自管理他们的公司时,他们通常会在另一家公司全职工作,或者在自己的企业中扮演非管理角色。在我们随后的分析中,我们调查了这两种类型的非管理型创始人的不同之处,为他们的行为动机提供了进一步的见解。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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