Dynamic Game Access Control Based on Trust

Shunan Ma
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Abstract

Access control refers to the whole suite of mechanisms that are used to govern user access to resources provided by computer systems over networks. Although many access control models have been proposed, such as DAC, MAC and RBAC, the functionality of these access control models is to make authorization decisions based on established access control policies. When the malicious access is identified, the access control system denies the request. However, the malicious entities may keep issuing more malicious access requests not afraid of punishment from the access control system. Such access control models are not adequate in open networks where the identities of entities may not be known. In this paper, we first apply some principles in game theory to analyze current access control models. With respect to behavior of entities, access control can be treated as a game between the requester and the provider entities. Then we propose a dynamic game access control model based on trust, which can respond to malicious access. The proposed model should follow the principles of bringing interactive entities to a state of Nash Equilibrium to make access control more effective. In the proposed model, we use access behavior trigger strategy along with a constraint mechanism that provides incentives for entities to perform honest access.
基于信任的动态博弈访问控制
访问控制是指一整套用于管理用户通过网络访问计算机系统提供的资源的机制。尽管已经提出了许多访问控制模型,如DAC、MAC和RBAC,但这些访问控制模型的功能是基于已建立的访问控制策略做出授权决策。当识别出恶意访问时,门禁系统会拒绝该请求。然而,恶意实体可能会不断发出更多的恶意访问请求,而不怕访问控制系统的惩罚。这种访问控制模型不适用于可能不知道实体身份的开放网络。本文首先运用博弈论的一些原理对现有的访问控制模型进行分析。对于实体的行为,访问控制可以看作是请求者和提供者实体之间的博弈。在此基础上,提出了一种基于信任的动态博弈访问控制模型,该模型能够有效应对恶意访问。所提出的模型应遵循使交互实体达到纳什均衡状态的原则,以使访问控制更加有效。在提出的模型中,我们使用访问行为触发策略和约束机制,为实体执行诚实访问提供激励。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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