Central Bank Independence: A Pseudo de Facto Case of Reserve Bank of India

A. Bhat, J. Khan
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Abstract

The trend of studies dealing with the correlation between central bank independence and inflation rose to prominence in the last twentieth century, 1980’s. These phenomena lead to development of certain empirical indices for measuring CBI across the countries. This study tries to evaluate the central bank independence in India using the index modelled on the lines of Jasmine Mona and Talla with minor modification regarding price stability objective. The study covers the time period from 1990–1991 till 2018–2019. The results found were that CBI has in India has more or less increased but improved significantly since the adoption of inflation targeting and formation of monetary policy committee post 2016.
中央银行独立性:印度储备银行的伪事实案例
中央银行独立性与通货膨胀关系的研究趋势在20世纪80年代兴起。这些现象导致了衡量各国CBI的某些经验指数的发展。本研究试图利用茉莉莫娜和塔拉的指数模型来评估印度中央银行的独立性,并对价格稳定目标进行了轻微的修改。该研究涵盖了从1990-1991年到2018-2019年的时间段。结果发现,自2016年后采用通货膨胀目标制和成立货币政策委员会以来,印度的CBI或多或少有所增加,但有显着改善。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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