{"title":"Targeted Incentives, Broad Impacts: Evidence from an E-commerce Platform","authors":"Xiang Hui, Meng Liu, T. Chan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3709380","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Digital platforms sometimes offer incentives to a subset of sellers to nudge behaviors, but how do these targeted incentives affect all sellers? In this paper, we study a policy change on a large e-commerce platform that offers financial incentives only to platform-certified sellers when they provide fast handling and generous return policies on their listings. We find that both the targeted and non-targeted sellers become more likely to adopt the promoted behavior after the policy change. Exploiting a large number of markets on the platform, we find that in markets with a larger proportion of the targeted population---hence more affected by the policy change---non-targeted sellers are more likely to adopt the promoted behavior and experience a larger increase in sales with little price changes. This finding is consistent with our key insight that a targeted incentive may increase demand for non-targeted sellers if both the targeted type and the promoted behavior are observed and valued by consumers. Our results have managerial implications for digital platforms that use targeted incentives.","PeriodicalId":430354,"journal":{"name":"IO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets eJournal","volume":"111 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3709380","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Digital platforms sometimes offer incentives to a subset of sellers to nudge behaviors, but how do these targeted incentives affect all sellers? In this paper, we study a policy change on a large e-commerce platform that offers financial incentives only to platform-certified sellers when they provide fast handling and generous return policies on their listings. We find that both the targeted and non-targeted sellers become more likely to adopt the promoted behavior after the policy change. Exploiting a large number of markets on the platform, we find that in markets with a larger proportion of the targeted population---hence more affected by the policy change---non-targeted sellers are more likely to adopt the promoted behavior and experience a larger increase in sales with little price changes. This finding is consistent with our key insight that a targeted incentive may increase demand for non-targeted sellers if both the targeted type and the promoted behavior are observed and valued by consumers. Our results have managerial implications for digital platforms that use targeted incentives.