Leases and Executory Contracts in Chapter 11

Kenneth M. Ayotte
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

This paper offers the first empirical analysis of the timing and disposition decisions large Chapter 11 debtors make with respect to their leases and other bilateral (“executory”) contracts in bankruptcy, with an emphasis on commercial real estate leases. Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, which governs these contracts, provides debtors with a rich set of strategic options that can be analyzed from a real options framework. The debtor can choose to keep (“assume”), abandon (“reject”), or transfer (“assign”) their contracts, with time limits provided by the Bankruptcy Code. I analyze the effect of a change to the Code in 2005 (BAPCPA) that shortens the time to expiration of a debtor’s option to reject, requiring tenant-debtors to make decisions on their real estate leases within seven months unless a landlord grants an extension. This paper offers several new findings. The distribution of leases and executory contracts across firms is highly skewed; for debtors at the tails, leases are quite important. At the 90th percentile, leases comprise 46.4% of the firm’s assets and over 70% of its financial liabilities. The main use of assignment in bankruptcy is to facilitate sales, rather than restructurings: over 90% of contract assignments occur in the context of sales of business units or the whole firm. I find that the seven month limit strongly accelerated real estate lease disposition decisions, suggesting that bankruptcy bargaining is far from a frictionless, Coasean world. Further, I find that BAPCPA is associated with a significantly lower probability of reorganization for the most lease-intensive firms. While debtors’ behavior is in some ways consistent with a simple real options theory, I find important deviations. In particular, some executory contracts are assumed before expiration. I present suggestive evidence of implicit contracting motives: debtors often assume early in order to secure performance from their counterparties that cannot be guaranteed by the contract alone.
第十一章的租约及契约执行
本文首次对大型破产法第11章债务人就其租赁和破产中的其他双边(“执行”)合同做出的时机和处置决定进行了实证分析,重点是商业房地产租赁。管理这些合同的《破产法》第365条为债务人提供了一套丰富的战略选择,可以从实物期权框架中进行分析。债务人可以选择保留(“承担”),放弃(“拒绝”)或转让(“转让”)他们的合同,有破产法规定的时间限制。我分析了2005年对法典的修改(BAPCPA)的影响,该修改缩短了债务人拒绝选择权的到期时间,要求承租人债务人在七个月内对其房地产租赁做出决定,除非房东同意延期。这篇论文提供了一些新的发现。公司间租赁和执行合同的分布是高度倾斜的;对于处于尾部的债务人来说,租赁是相当重要的。在第90百分位,租赁占公司资产的46.4%,占其金融负债的70%以上。转让在破产中的主要用途是促进销售,而不是重组:超过90%的合同转让发生在销售业务部门或整个公司的背景下。我发现,7个月的限制大大加快了房地产租赁处置的决定,这表明破产谈判远不是一个无摩擦的科斯世界。此外,我发现BAPCPA与大多数租赁密集型公司重组的可能性显著降低有关。虽然债务人的行为在某些方面与简单的实物期权理论相一致,但我发现了一些重要的偏差。特别是,一些可执行合同在到期前被假设。我提出了关于隐性合同动机的暗示性证据:债务人通常提前承担是为了确保其交易对手的履约,而单凭合同是无法保证的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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