Dodd-Frank, Liability Structure, and Financial Instability Cycles: Neither a (Ponzi) Borrower Nor a Lender Be

Joseba Gabilondo
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

The financial sector has by now mostly sprung back from the crisis that began in 2007, as have corporate profits; but the labor market still sags, mortgage credit is scarce, and the future prospects for the economy, while not bleak, are not rosy either. Seeing this ongoing harm to the real economy caused by financial activities, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Act (“Act”) with an eye to limiting future financial instability. The Act hopes to do this by updating financial regulation and creating better incentives for the private sector.To see how the crisis developed and whether the Act will work, we need to understand how financial instability develops in capitalist market systems like ours. Economist Hyman Minsky claimed that the financial sector in capitalist market systems tends to chase returns by gorging on risk until its own financial structure becomes unstable, leading to a crisis like the last one that started in 2007. The claim – known as the financial instability hypothesis – merits our attention because, though critical of the financial sector, evidence for it is derived from observing how banks actually operate over the business cycle.I use the hypothesis in Part I to show what animated the last corporate leverage cycle: escalating expectations for profit financed on progressively riskier credit terms. In fact, the hypothesis thesis belongs to a larger critique of conceptual approaches that deny the intrinsic instability of capitalist market systems, so I also use Minsky’s work to challenge claims made by nabobs of neoliberal negativism who are resisting the implementation of the Act. Part II addresses two aspects of the Act that bear directly on how the financial sector creates potentially destabilizing liabilities: (i) new requirements that leverage caused by financial swaps be margined and cleared; and (ii) a new mandate that federal regulatory capital requirements go in the opposite direction of the boom-bust dynamics characteristic of the business cycle.
多德-弗兰克法案,债务结构和金融不稳定周期:既不是(庞氏)借方也不是贷方
到目前为止,金融业基本上已经从始于2007年的危机中复苏,企业利润也是如此;但劳动力市场依然低迷,抵押贷款稀缺,经济的未来前景虽然不暗淡,但也不乐观。鉴于金融活动对实体经济造成的持续伤害,国会颁布了《多德-弗兰克法案》(Dodd-Frank Act),旨在限制未来的金融不稳定。该法案希望通过更新金融监管和为私营部门创造更好的激励机制来实现这一目标。要了解危机是如何发展的,以及该法案是否会起作用,我们需要了解像我们这样的资本主义市场体系中金融不稳定是如何发展的。经济学家海曼·明斯基(Hyman Minsky)声称,资本主义市场体系中的金融部门倾向于通过承担风险来追逐回报,直到其自身的金融结构变得不稳定,从而导致像2007年开始的上一次危机那样的危机。这一主张——被称为金融不稳定假说——值得我们关注,因为尽管它对金融部门持批评态度,但它的证据来自对银行在商业周期中的实际运作方式的观察。我在第一部分中使用假设来说明是什么推动了上一个企业杠杆周期:在风险越来越高的信贷条件下,对利润的预期不断上升。事实上,假设命题属于对否认资本主义市场体系内在不稳定性的概念方法的更大批判,因此我也用明斯基的工作来挑战新自由主义否定主义的大富豪们的主张,他们正在抵制该法案的实施。第二部分阐述了该法案的两个方面,这两个方面直接关系到金融部门如何产生潜在的不稳定负债:(i)对金融掉期造成的杠杆进行保证金和清算的新要求;(ii)联邦监管资本要求与商业周期的繁荣-萧条动态特征相反的新授权。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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