Endogenous Strategic Issue Linkage in International Negotiations

C. Carraro, C. Marchiori
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引用次数: 107

Abstract

This paper analyses issue linkage as a way to increase co-operation on issues where incentives to free-ride are strong. The goal is to determine under what conditions players prefer to link negotiations on two different issues rather than to negotiate on the two issues separately. Suppose that players are asked to vote on issue linkage before starting negotiations. Under what conditions would they vote in favour of issue linkage? The answer to this question is not trivial. Issue linkage may indeed increase the number of cooperators on the provision of a public good (a typical issue characterised by strong incentives to free-ride). However, at the same time, issue linkage may reduce the number of cooperating players on the other economic issue which is linked to the provision of a public good. Players therefore face a trade-off. This paper analyses this trade-off within a game-theoretic framework and shows under what conditions issue linkage is players’ equilibrium strategy.
国际谈判中的内生性战略问题联系
本文分析了问题联系作为在搭便车动机强的问题上增加合作的一种方式。目标是确定在什么条件下,参与者更愿意将两个不同问题的谈判联系起来,而不是分别就两个问题进行谈判。假设玩家被要求在开始谈判前就问题关联进行投票。在什么情况下,他们会投票赞成发行挂钩?这个问题的答案并不简单。问题联系可能确实会增加提供公共产品的合作者的数量(这是一个典型的问题,其特点是搭便车的强烈动机)。然而,与此同时,问题联系可能会减少在与提供公共产品有关的其他经济问题上进行合作的参与者的数量。因此,玩家面临着一种权衡。本文在博弈论框架下分析了这种权衡,并说明了在什么条件下问题联系是参与人的均衡策略。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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