Managing Scarcity and Ambition in the NZ ETS

Catherine Leining, Suzi Kerr
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引用次数: 12

Abstract

The fundamental purpose of an emissions trading system (ETS) is to constrain emissions and enable the market to set an emissions price path that facilitates an effective transition to a low-emissions economy. In a conventional ETS, the emissions constraint is defined by a cap (a fixed limit) on tradable, government-issued emission units together with a quantity limit on any external units allowed in the system (e.g. via an offsets mechanism). Essentially, an ETS cap underpins the ambition, cost-effectiveness, distributional implications, and credibility of a jurisdiction’s approach to decarbonisation. From 2008 to mid-2015, the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZ ETS) broke from convention by linking to the global Kyoto cap without its own limit on domestic emissions. NZ ETS participants met compliance obligations using unlimited overseas units at low prices and faced little incentive to reduce their own emissions. The NZ ETS delinked from the Kyoto market in mid-2015, creating uncertainty over the future of domestic unit supply and an efficient price path for domestic decarbonisation. This working paper, which evolved under Motu’s ETS Dialogue process from 2016 to 2018, explores key considerations for ETS cap setting and proposes the design for a cap on units auctioned and freely allocated in the NZ ETS. The recommendations focus on issues of cap architecture rather than ambition. The proposed cap is defined in tonnes of emissions per year, fixed for five years in advance, extended by one year each year, and guided by an indicative ten-year cap trajectory. The fixed cap and cap trajectory need to reflect consideration of New Zealand’s domestic decarbonisation objectives, international targets, mitigation potential and costs in both ETS and non-ETS sectors, and prospects for cost-effective investment in overseas emission reductions. Two companion working papers address how the choice of cap will interact with decisions on ETS price management mechanisms and linking to overseas markets. The three working papers elaborate on an integrated proposal for managing unit supply, prices, and linking in the NZ ETS that was presented in Kerr et al. (2017).
在新西兰教育交易体系中管理稀缺和雄心
排放交易体系(ETS)的根本目的是限制排放,并使市场能够设定排放价格路径,从而促进向低排放经济的有效过渡。在传统的碳排放交易体系中,排放约束是由政府发行的可交易排放单位的上限(固定限制)以及系统中允许的任何外部单位的数量限制(例如通过抵消机制)来定义的。从本质上讲,碳排放交易体系的上限支撑着一个司法管辖区去碳化方法的雄心、成本效益、分配影响和可信度。从2008年到2015年年中,新西兰排放交易计划(NZ ETS)打破常规,与全球《京都议定书》的上限挂钩,而没有对国内排放进行限制。新西兰排放交易体系的参与者以低廉的价格使用无限制的海外排放单位来履行合规义务,并且几乎没有减少自身排放的动力。2015年年中,新西兰碳排放交易体系与《京都议定书》市场脱钩,给国内单位供应的未来带来了不确定性,也为国内脱碳提供了一条有效的价格路径。这份工作文件是在2016年至2018年Motu的ETS对话过程中发展起来的,探讨了ETS限额设置的关键考虑因素,并提出了在新西兰ETS中拍卖和自由分配单位的限额设计。这些建议关注的是上限架构问题,而不是目标。拟议的上限以每年排放吨为单位,提前五年确定,每年延长一年,并以指示性的十年上限轨迹为指导。固定限额和限额轨迹需要反映对新西兰国内脱碳目标、国际目标、碳排放交易体系和非碳排放交易体系部门的缓解潜力和成本,以及对海外减排进行具有成本效益投资的前景的考虑。两份配套的工作文件探讨了限额的选择将如何与碳排放交易体系价格管理机制的决定以及与海外市场的联系相互作用。这三篇工作论文详细阐述了Kerr等人(2017年)提出的管理新西兰碳排放交易体系单位供应、价格和链接的综合建议。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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