{"title":"HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN LIBYA: IS IT CAUSING INTERNAL WAR?","authors":"Mitsuhisa Fukutomi","doi":"10.15057/28303","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Following the Qaddafi regimeʼs targeting of civilians in February 2011, the United Nations (UN) authorized military intervention in Libya to protect the countryʼs civilians. In March 2011, a coalition of NATO allies and partners began enforcing an arms embargo, maintaining a nofly zone and protecting civilians and civilian populated areas from attack or the threat of attack in Libya under Operation Unified Protector (OUP). OUP was “successfully” concluded on 31 October 2011 1 . Western media and politicians applauded the intervention based on the “responsibility to protect”(R2P)as a humanitarian achievement for helping replace the dictatorial Qaddafi regime with a transitional council in Benghazi, Libyaʼs second largest city, pledged to democracy. Libyaʼs post-conflict transition, however, has been disrupted by armed militia groups and threatened by the conflict of interim leaders. The situation continued to have a negative impact on the living conditions and security of the local population, and was aggravated by the high rate of gun ownership among the population in the absence of any disarmament and effective weapons control efforts. Did NATO forces take advantage of the R2P norm in order to impose regime change in Libya? Did arming the Libyan rebels fall within the R2P norm? Was the application of R2P in Libya undermined by the fact that there was an immediate resort to military action? Hitotsubashi Journal of Law and Politics 45 (2017), pp.23-32. C Hitotsubashi University","PeriodicalId":208983,"journal":{"name":"Hitotsubashi journal of law and politics","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Hitotsubashi journal of law and politics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.15057/28303","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Following the Qaddafi regimeʼs targeting of civilians in February 2011, the United Nations (UN) authorized military intervention in Libya to protect the countryʼs civilians. In March 2011, a coalition of NATO allies and partners began enforcing an arms embargo, maintaining a nofly zone and protecting civilians and civilian populated areas from attack or the threat of attack in Libya under Operation Unified Protector (OUP). OUP was “successfully” concluded on 31 October 2011 1 . Western media and politicians applauded the intervention based on the “responsibility to protect”(R2P)as a humanitarian achievement for helping replace the dictatorial Qaddafi regime with a transitional council in Benghazi, Libyaʼs second largest city, pledged to democracy. Libyaʼs post-conflict transition, however, has been disrupted by armed militia groups and threatened by the conflict of interim leaders. The situation continued to have a negative impact on the living conditions and security of the local population, and was aggravated by the high rate of gun ownership among the population in the absence of any disarmament and effective weapons control efforts. Did NATO forces take advantage of the R2P norm in order to impose regime change in Libya? Did arming the Libyan rebels fall within the R2P norm? Was the application of R2P in Libya undermined by the fact that there was an immediate resort to military action? Hitotsubashi Journal of Law and Politics 45 (2017), pp.23-32. C Hitotsubashi University