The Law and Economics of De-Policing

L. Rosenthal
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

There is mounting evidence for what some have dubbed “De-Policing" — police retreat in the face of hostile public scrutiny, often in the wake of a highly publicized incident of police misconduct. Recent data reviewed by Professors Richard Rosenfeld and Paul Cassell in their important papers document sharp spikes in violent crime in major cities following the outbreak of widespread protests against police violence beginning in May 2020, after the killing of George Floyd by Minneapolis police officers. It is a devilishly difficult business to ascertain the causes of changes in crime rates. Even granting the ineradicable uncertainties, this article argues that there is an impressive case that the 2020 crime spike reflects de-policing. This paper first examines the data reflecting what Professor Cassell dubs a "Minneapolis Effect" because it followed the police killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis, and then considers the likely mechanism that produces this type of de-policing effect. In particular, the law and economics of policing suggest the most likely mechanism for the decline in law enforcement activity documented by Professor Cassell. Because police officers internalize few, if any, of the benefits of effective policing, when they perceive a risk that they will be made to internalize its costs, over-deterrence is the likely outcome. Anti-police protests demanding that police officers be disciplined or otherwise penalized suggest to officers an increased probability that they will internalize the costs of policing without internalizing its benefits. This theory of police incentives suggest that de-policing is the likely result, at least when the threat of sanctioning police officers is perceived as credible. There are important policy implications of this conclusion. Policing reforms must be alert to the risk that they will over-deter officers, and thereby spur increases in violent crime, which will impose disproportionate costs on disadvantaged communities and people of color.
去警务化的法律与经济学
越来越多的证据表明,一些人称之为“去警务化”——警察在面对充满敌意的公众监督时退缩,通常是在警察不当行为被高度曝光之后。理查德·罗森菲尔德(Richard Rosenfeld)教授和保罗·卡塞尔(Paul Cassell)教授在其重要论文中审查的最新数据显示,在明尼阿波利斯警察杀害乔治·弗洛伊德(George Floyd)后,自2020年5月开始爆发针对警察暴力的广泛抗议活动以来,主要城市的暴力犯罪急剧上升。确定犯罪率变化的原因是一件极其困难的事情。即使承认不可消除的不确定性,这篇文章认为,有一个令人印象深刻的案例表明,2020年的犯罪高峰反映了警务的解除。这篇论文首先考察了卡塞尔教授所称的“明尼阿波利斯效应”的数据,因为它是在明尼阿波利斯警察杀死乔治·弗洛伊德(George Floyd)之后发生的,然后考虑了产生这种非警务效应的可能机制。特别是,警务的法律和经济学提出了卡塞尔教授所记录的执法活动减少的最有可能的机制。因为警察很少内化有效警务的好处,如果有的话,当他们意识到他们将被迫内化其成本的风险时,过度威慑是可能的结果。要求对警察进行纪律处分或以其他方式惩罚的反警察抗议活动向警察表明,他们更有可能将维持治安的成本内在化,而不将其收益内在化。这种警察激励理论表明,至少在制裁警察的威胁被认为是可信的情况下,去警务化是可能的结果。这一结论具有重要的政策含义。警务改革必须警惕这样的风险,即过度威慑警察,从而刺激暴力犯罪的增加,这将给弱势社区和有色人种带来不成比例的成本。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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