SIPHON: Towards Scalable High-Interaction Physical Honeypots

J. Guarnizo, Amit Tambe, S. Bhunia, Martín Ochoa, Nils Ole Tippenhauer, A. Shabtai, Y. Elovici
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引用次数: 95

Abstract

In recent years, the emerging Internet-of-Things (IoT) has led to rising concerns about the security of networked embedded devices. In this work, we propose the SIPHON architecture---a Scalable high-Interaction Honeypot platform for IoT devices. Our architecture leverages IoT devices that are physically at one location and are connected to the Internet through so-called \emph{wormholes} distributed around the world. The resulting architecture allows exposing few physical devices over a large number of geographically distributed IP addresses. We demonstrate the proposed architecture in a large scale experiment with 39 wormhole instances in 16 cities in 9 countries. Based on this setup, five physical IP cameras, one NVR and one IP printer are presented as 85 real IoT devices on the Internet, attracting a daily traffic of 700MB for a period of two months. A preliminary analysis of the collected traffic indicates that devices in some cities attracted significantly more traffic than others (ranging from 600 000 incoming TCP connections for the most popular destination to less than 50 000 for the least popular). We recorded over 400 brute-force login attempts to the web-interface of our devices using a total of 1826 distinct credentials, from which 11 attempts were successful. Moreover, we noted login attempts to Telnet and SSH ports some of which used credentials found in the recently disclosed Mirai malware.
SIPHON:迈向可扩展的高交互物理蜜罐
近年来,新兴的物联网(IoT)引起了人们对联网嵌入式设备安全性的关注。在这项工作中,我们提出了SIPHON架构——一个可扩展的高交互蜜罐平台,用于物联网设备。我们的架构利用物联网设备,这些设备物理上位于一个位置,并通过分布在世界各地的所谓\emph{虫洞}连接到互联网。由此产生的体系结构允许在大量地理上分布的IP地址上暴露少量物理设备。我们在9个国家16个城市的39个虫洞实例中进行了大规模实验,验证了所提出的架构。在此基础上,将5台物理IP摄像头、1台NVR和1台IP打印机作为85台真实物联网设备在互联网上展示,在两个月的时间里,每天吸引700MB的流量。对收集到的流量的初步分析表明,一些城市的设备比其他城市吸引了更多的流量(从最受欢迎的目的地的60万个传入TCP连接到最不受欢迎的目的地的不到5万个)。我们记录了400多次使用1826个不同凭据的暴力登录尝试,其中11次尝试成功。此外,我们注意到Telnet和SSH端口的登录尝试,其中一些使用了最近披露的Mirai恶意软件中的凭据。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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