{"title":"Subsidiarity and Fundamental Rights Protection in the United States","authors":"I. Wurman","doi":"10.47078/2022.1.241-257","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Since the middle of the last century, fundamental rights protection in the United States has largely been the domain of the federal government, and primarily its Supreme Court. Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which guarantees “due process of law,” the United States Supreme Court has assumed for itself the role of defining fundamental rights even if such rights are not specifically enumerated in any constitutional text and requiring all states to abide by such rights, a concept referred to as “substantive due process.” It has also “incorporated” the Bill of Rights in the federal Constitution against the state governments, even though such rights historically only bound the federal government. These doctrinal developments were likely mistakes, at least if Americans purport to be bound by the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to their Constitution. “Due process of law” was not a substantive guarantee of unenumerated rights or against unreasonable legislation. In antebellum America, judicial courts did review local or municipal legislation to ensure reasonableness, but not the legislation of the states themselves except in narrow circumstances. Many American scholars believe that the “privileges or immunities” clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, instead of the due process clause, is what was intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights against the states and transfer fundamental rights protections to the federal government. This, too, is likely incorrect, as that clause was likely a guarantee merely of equality, leaving it up to the state governments otherwise to define and regulate the content of civil rights. This account, if correct, suggests that the Fourteenth Amendment, while guaranteeing the fundamental right to equality, otherwise respected the principle of subsidiarity even in the protection of fundamental rights, and provides insights for the ongoing European debate over fundamental rights protection.","PeriodicalId":325719,"journal":{"name":"Central European Journal of Comparative Law","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Central European Journal of Comparative Law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.47078/2022.1.241-257","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Since the middle of the last century, fundamental rights protection in the United States has largely been the domain of the federal government, and primarily its Supreme Court. Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which guarantees “due process of law,” the United States Supreme Court has assumed for itself the role of defining fundamental rights even if such rights are not specifically enumerated in any constitutional text and requiring all states to abide by such rights, a concept referred to as “substantive due process.” It has also “incorporated” the Bill of Rights in the federal Constitution against the state governments, even though such rights historically only bound the federal government. These doctrinal developments were likely mistakes, at least if Americans purport to be bound by the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to their Constitution. “Due process of law” was not a substantive guarantee of unenumerated rights or against unreasonable legislation. In antebellum America, judicial courts did review local or municipal legislation to ensure reasonableness, but not the legislation of the states themselves except in narrow circumstances. Many American scholars believe that the “privileges or immunities” clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, instead of the due process clause, is what was intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights against the states and transfer fundamental rights protections to the federal government. This, too, is likely incorrect, as that clause was likely a guarantee merely of equality, leaving it up to the state governments otherwise to define and regulate the content of civil rights. This account, if correct, suggests that the Fourteenth Amendment, while guaranteeing the fundamental right to equality, otherwise respected the principle of subsidiarity even in the protection of fundamental rights, and provides insights for the ongoing European debate over fundamental rights protection.
自上世纪中叶以来,美国的基本权利保护在很大程度上是联邦政府的职责,主要是最高法院的职责。根据保障“正当法律程序”的《美国宪法第十四修正案》(14th Amendment to the United States Constitution),美国最高法院承担了界定基本权利的职责,即使这些权利在任何宪法文本中都没有具体列举,并要求所有州遵守这些权利,这一概念被称为“实质性正当程序”。它还将《权利法案》“纳入”联邦宪法,反对州政府,尽管这些权利在历史上只约束联邦政府。这些教义上的发展很可能是错误的,至少如果美国人声称受宪法第十四修正案原意的约束的话。“正当法律程序”并不是对未列举的权利或对不合理立法的实质性保证。在南北战争前的美国,司法法院确实审查地方或市政立法以确保其合理性,但除非在特殊情况下,否则不会审查各州本身的立法。许多美国学者认为,宪法第十四修正案的“特权或豁免”条款,而不是正当程序条款,旨在将《权利法案》纳入针对各州的条款,并将基本权利的保护转移给联邦政府。这也可能是不正确的,因为该条款可能只是保证平等,而将公民权利的内容定义和规范留给州政府。这种说法,如果正确的话,表明第十四修正案在保证平等的基本权利的同时,甚至在保护基本权利方面也尊重辅助原则,并为欧洲正在进行的关于保护基本权利的辩论提供了见解。