Concurrent error detection revisited: hardware protection against fault and side-channel attacks

Jan Richter-Brockmann, Pascal Sasdrich, Florian Bache, T. Güneysu
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

Fault Injection Analysis (FIA) and Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) are considered among the most serious threats to cryptographic implementations and require dedicated countermeasures to ensure protection through the entire life-cycle of the implementations. In this work, our contribution is twofold. First, we present a novel orthogonal layout of linear Error-Correcting Codes (ECCs) to adjust classical Concurrent Error Detection (CED) to an adversary model that assumes precisely induced single-bit faults which, with a certain non-negligible probability, will affect adjacent bits. Second, we combine our orthogonal error correction technique with a state-of-the-art SCA protection mechanism to demonstrate resistance against both threats. Eventually, using AES as a case study, our approach can correct entirely faulted bytes while it does not exhibit detectable first-order side-channel leakage using 200 million power traces and Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) as state-of-the-art leakage assessment methodology. Furthermore, our hardware implementations reduce the area and resource consumption by 14.9% -- 18.3% for recent technology nodes (compared to a conventional CED scheme).
并发错误检测:针对故障和侧信道攻击的硬件保护
故障注入分析(FIA)和侧信道分析(SCA)被认为是对加密实现最严重的威胁,需要专门的对策来确保在实现的整个生命周期内都受到保护。在这项工作中,我们的贡献是双重的。首先,我们提出了一种新的线性纠错码(ECCs)的正交布局,将经典的并发错误检测(CED)调整为一个对手模型,该模型假设精确诱导的单比特故障,这些故障具有一定的不可忽略的概率,将影响相邻的比特。其次,我们将正交纠错技术与最先进的SCA保护机制结合起来,以演示对这两种威胁的抵抗力。最后,使用AES作为案例研究,我们的方法可以完全纠正有故障的字节,同时使用2亿电源走线和测试向量泄漏评估(TVLA)作为最先进的泄漏评估方法,它不会表现出可检测的一阶侧信道泄漏。此外,我们的硬件实现减少了14.9% - 18.3%的面积和资源消耗的最新技术节点(与传统的CED方案相比)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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