Making Bank Resolution Credible

J. Armour
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引用次数: 21

Abstract

Financial difficulties at large financial institutions present governments and regulators with an unenviable dilemma. On the one hand, they are afraid to permit such a firm to enter 'ordinary' insolvency proceedings, lest this transmit financial shock to other, connected, institutions. Yet every voter can grasp the moral hazard problems and distributional inequity associated with government handouts for the financial sector. Consequently many jurisdictions have introduced, or are designing, 'special resolution' mechanisms for financial institutions. The first generation of such mechanisms were based on the US FDIC receivership regime. They focus on waiving property rights so as to effect a very rapid transfer of complex assets and short-term liabilities to a purchaser who will be able to stand behind those liabilities and thereby ensure stability. This model works well for small to medium sized domestic banks, but is insufficient to provide a credible alternative to bailouts for large, complex financial institutions. As a result, a series of new measures — which we have termed 'second generation' resolution mechanisms — have been developed. First, there has been a realization that the level of complexity is such that resolution ex post is impossible without careful planning by supervisors ex ante. Second, this planning process can be used not only to understand, but also to modify, the structure of complex financial institutions and their regulatory oversight so as to facilitate resolution should it be necessary. Third, the use of 'bail-in' or mandated debt to equity swaps provides a potentially very useful additional resolution tool when used in conjunction with such forward planning and oversight. Fourth, in the context of international financial institutions, coordination and allocation of responsibility amongst national regulators is an integral part of the planning process. The implications of this shift are clear. For the resolution of large complex financial institutions to be credible, it must be thought of as an integral part of the ongoing oversight of financial institutions by regulators, and not as simply a set of mechanisms that are kept for troubled times. Investment in regulatory capacity — recruitment and training to build human capital in the regulatory sector — is therefore crucial to ensuring the success of resolution.
提高银行处置的可信度
大型金融机构的财务困难,让政府和监管机构陷入了一个令人难堪的困境。一方面,他们害怕允许这样一家公司进入“普通”破产程序,以免将金融冲击传递给其他相关机构。然而,每个选民都能理解与政府对金融部门的援助相关的道德风险问题和分配不平等。因此,许多司法管辖区已经引入或正在设计针对金融机构的“特别处置”机制。第一代此类机制是基于美国联邦存款保险公司(FDIC)的破产管理制度。它们侧重于放弃产权,以便将复杂资产和短期负债迅速转移给能够支持这些负债的购买者,从而确保稳定性。这种模式对中小型国内银行很有效,但不足以为大型复杂金融机构提供一种可靠的替代方案。因此,制定了一系列新的措施——我们称之为“第二代”解决机制。首先,人们已经认识到,如果没有监管者事先的仔细规划,事后解决问题是不可能的。其次,这一规划过程不仅可以用来理解,还可以用来修改复杂金融机构的结构及其监管监督,以便在必要时促进解决。第三,“内部纾困”(bail-in)或强制性债转股的使用,在与此类前瞻性规划和监督结合使用时,提供了一个可能非常有用的额外解决工具。第四,在国际金融机构的背景下,各国监管机构之间的协调和责任分配是规划过程的一个组成部分。这种转变的含义是显而易见的。要使大型复杂金融机构的解决方案可信,就必须将其视为监管机构对金融机构进行持续监管的一个组成部分,而不仅仅是一套为困难时期保留的机制。因此,对监管能力的投资——招聘和培训以在监管部门建立人力资本——对于确保解决方案的成功至关重要。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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