Eliminating Inter-Domain Vulnerabilities in Cyber-Physical Systems: An Analysis Contracts Approach

I. Ruchkin, Ashwini Rao, Dionisio de Niz, S. Chaki, D. Garlan
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引用次数: 12

Abstract

Designing secure cyber-physical systems (CPS) is a particularly difficult task since security vulnerabilities stem not only from traditional cybersecurity concerns, but also physical ones. Many of the standard methods for CPS design make strong and unverified assumptions about the trustworthiness of physical devices, such as sensors. When these assumptions are violated, subtle inter-domain vulnerabilities are introduced into the system model. In this paper we use formal specification of analysis contracts to expose security assumptions and guarantees of analyses from reliability, control, and sensor security domains. We show that this specification allows us to determine where these assumptions are violated, opening the door to malicious attacks. We demonstrate how this approach can help discover and prevent vulnerabilities using a self-driving car example.
消除网络物理系统中的域间漏洞:一种分析契约方法
设计安全的网络物理系统(CPS)是一项特别困难的任务,因为安全漏洞不仅源于传统的网络安全问题,而且源于物理问题。许多CPS设计的标准方法都对物理设备(如传感器)的可靠性做出了强烈且未经验证的假设。当这些假设被违反时,微妙的域间漏洞就会被引入系统模型。在本文中,我们使用分析契约的正式规范来公开来自可靠性、控制和传感器安全领域的分析的安全假设和保证。我们表明,该规范允许我们确定违反这些假设的地方,从而为恶意攻击打开大门。我们用一个自动驾驶汽车的例子来演示这种方法如何帮助发现和预防漏洞。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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