A Coalition Formation Game for Cooperative Spectrum Sensing in Cognitive Radio Network under the Constraint of Overhead

Abstract

Cooperative spectrum sensing improves the sensing performance of secondary users by exploiting spatial diversity in cognitive radio networks. However, the cooperation of secondary users introduces some overhead also that may degrade the overall performance of cooperative spectrum sensing.  The trade-off between cooperation gain and overhead plays a vital role in modeling cooperative spectrum sensing.  This paper considers overhead in terms of reporting energy and reporting time. We propose a cooperative spectrum sensing based coalitional game model where the utility of the game is formulated as a function of throughput gain and overhead. To achieve a rational average throughput of secondary users, the overhead incurred is to be optimized. This work emphasizes on optimization of the overhead incurred. In cooperative spectrum sensing, the large number of cooperating users improve the detection performance, on the contrary, it increases overhead too. So, to limit the maximum coalition size we propose a formulation under the constraint of the probability of false alarm. An efficient fusion center selection scheme and an algorithm to select eligible secondary users for reporting are proposed to reduce the reporting overhead. We also outline a distributed cooperative spectrum sensing algorithm using the properties of the coalition formation game and prove that the utility of the proposed game has non-transferable properties.  The simulation results show that the proposed schemes reduce the overhead of reporting without compromising the overall detection performance of cooperative spectrum sensing.