Detection of Pilot Spoofing Attack Over Frequency Selective Channels

Jitendra Tugnait
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

In a time-division duplex (TDD) multiple antenna system, the channel state information (CSI) can be estimated using reverse training. A pilot contamination (spoofing) attack occurs when during the training phase, an adversary also sends identical training (pilot) signal as that of the legitimate receiver. This contaminates channel estimation and alters the legitimate precoder/beamformimg design, facilitating eavesdropping. Past approaches to pilot spoofing detection are limited to flat fading channels. In this paper we propose a novel approach for detection of pilot spoofing attack over frequency selective channels, with unknown channels and channel lengths, except that an upperbound on the number of channel taps is assumed to be known. The proposed approach is illustrated by numerical examples and they show the efficacy of the proposed approach. A method to estimate Bob’s channel regardless of the spoofing attack, is also presented and illustrated via simulations.
频选信道导频欺骗攻击检测
在时分双工(TDD)多天线系统中,信道状态信息(CSI)可以通过反向训练来估计。当攻击者在训练阶段也发送与合法接收方相同的训练(飞行员)信号时,就会发生飞行员污染(欺骗)攻击。这会影响信道估计并改变合法的预编码器/波束形成设计,从而促进窃听。过去的导频欺骗检测方法仅限于平坦衰落信道。在本文中,我们提出了一种新的方法来检测频率选择信道上的导频欺骗攻击,这些信道和信道长度都是未知的,除了信道抽头数量的上界是已知的。数值算例说明了所提方法的有效性。本文还提出了一种不考虑欺骗攻击的估计Bob信道的方法,并通过仿真进行了说明。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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