Varieties of Damages for Breach of Privacy

Abstract

This paper offers a comprehensive account of the law of damages within the action for misuse of private information in English law. The paper interrogates which types of damages are and ought to be available for breach of privacy, and the legal rules and principles governing each form of damages including the approach to quantification. In examining the law of damages the paper considers the nature of the emergent privacy action, arguing that it has shed its equitable origins in breach of confidence and now closely resembles 'vindicatory' actions such as false imprisonment, battery and trespass to land. In turn the remedial approach for breach of privacy increasingly follows that adopted within these torts. The paper first considers compensatory damages, arguing that a 'vindicatory' model ought to characterise the approach to compensatory damages, and is the prevailing approach in English law following the High Court and Court of Appeal's important decisions in Gulati v MGN Ltd. According to this approach, damages are available for the wrongful invasion of privacy in itself, irrespective of the suffering of material loss. In addition consequential losses are recoverable, including distress, recognised psychiatric illness and financial loss. Damages are available as of right and are not to be analogised with awards of 'just satisfaction' made by the European Court of Human Rights. The paper then examines non-compensatory damages. The courts are yet to authoritatively determine the availability of such damages for breach of privacy, and the principles governing their award. The paper argues that exemplary damages ought to be available, but quantum should not be so high as to constitute disproportionate interference with free expression. An account of profits should not be available. But if such remedy were to be recognised it ought to be awarded only exceptionally and the criteria for granting an account should follow the normative concerns that underpin the privacy action. Reasonable fee or user damages are one means of measuring loss in property torts; they are not restitutionary. They ought not to be available for breach of privacy as it would be inapt to treat dignitary interests as if they were interests in tradeable commodities. The novel head of 'vindicatory' damages, recognised in a series of Privy Council appeals, should not be available as they would add nothing to existing remedies. Lastly, the paper considers damages in lieu of an injunction, arguing that these damages compensate for the loss of a legal liberty to enforce primary rights; they are not restitutionary. Such damages ought very rarely to be awarded in the place of an injunction in a case of ongoing, unjustified invasion of privacy.