Some Law & Economics of the Class Action

E. Mackaay
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Abstract

Class actions aim to bring economies of scale to bear on legal proceedings, by joining cases that have a common cause of action against a common defendant into a single lawsuit leading to a judgment or settlement that binds the entire class. Legal procedures, lawyer time, evidence by experts and court resources are thus all used once for all, rather than multiple times during individual lawsuits. Where individuals would not have brought suit because the damage they suffered is too small in relation to the minimal fixed cost of a lawsuit (small claims, but, in a different sense, also mass torts, where the evidentiary problems may be extraordinarily complex and costly), the class action may make it possible to impose on a wrongdoer the full weight of individually small harms inflicted on many persons, that would otherwise go unchallenged. From an economic point of view, this "internalisation" of costs, shoring up the deterrent effect of legal rules, is a desirable development. Where individual victims are facing a large enterprise that is a repeat player in similar matters, with an interest in fighting to prevent any adverse judgment, the class action may (somewhat) level the playing field. Even where the individual interest at stake is large enough to justify a lawsuit, resorting to a class action may still be worthwhile given the more ample resources that can be mobilised, considering the size of the class, to collect evidence and present the case in court. While the class action's potential deterrent effect and the economies of scale in legal proceedings are undisputed, the procedure generates its own transaction costs, in particular as regards the agency problem of supervising the class counsel handling the case, whose interests may diverge from those of the class members. Class actions also create a risk of litigation about trivia, which in ordinary proceedings is controlled by the de minimis judex non curat rule. Furthermore, the size of the class may cause difficulties in contacting some of the members and of distributing the sums collected, such that a leftover amount may have to be paid to an outside entity whose activities favour the class. As the class action makes its deterrent effect felt, it becomes apparent that it is an alternative to direct regulation of potentially wrongful behaviour. This raises the question of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of this procedure.
集体诉讼的法律与经济学问题
集体诉讼旨在通过将针对共同被告的共同诉因的案件合并为一起诉讼,从而导致对整个集体具有约束力的判决或和解,从而在法律诉讼中发挥规模经济的作用。因此,法律程序、律师时间、专家证据和法庭资源都是一次性使用,而不是在个别诉讼中多次使用。如果个人不会提起诉讼,因为他们遭受的损害与诉讼的最低固定成本相比太小(小额索赔,但在另一种意义上,也包括大规模侵权,其中证据问题可能非常复杂和昂贵),集体诉讼可能使不法行为者有可能对许多人造成的个人小伤害施加全部重量,否则就不会受到挑战。从经济角度来看,这种成本的“内部化”,支持法律规则的威慑作用,是一种可取的发展。如果个人受害者面对的是一家在类似事件中反复出现的大型企业,并且有兴趣为防止任何不利的判决而斗争,那么集体诉讼可能(在某种程度上)公平竞争。即使在个人利益攸关的情况下,诉诸集体诉讼可能仍然是值得的,因为考虑到集体的规模,可以动员更充足的资源来收集证据并在法庭上提出案件。虽然集体诉讼的潜在威慑作用和法律程序中的规模经济是无可争议的,但该程序产生了自己的交易成本,特别是在监督处理案件的集体律师的代理问题上,他们的利益可能与集体成员的利益不同。集体诉讼还会产生鸡毛蒜头的诉讼风险,而在普通诉讼中,鸡毛蒜头的诉讼是由最低限度裁判权非现行权规则控制的。此外,班级的规模可能会在联系一些成员和分配所筹集的款项方面造成困难,因此,剩余的金额可能不得不支付给其活动有利于班级的外部实体。随着集体诉讼的威慑效果得到体现,很明显,它是对潜在不法行为进行直接监管的另一种选择。这就提出了这一程序的相对优势和劣势的问题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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