Agility Over Stability: China’s Great Reversal in Regulating the Platform Economy

A. Zhang
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引用次数: 8

Abstract

This paper develops a new theoretical framework to analyze Chinese regulatory governance by considering the strategic interaction between four key players involved in the regulatory process: the top leadership, the regulators, the firms and the public. By focusing on China’s great reversal in regulating the platform economy, I argue that China’s volatile style of policymaking is deeply ingrained in its authoritarian governance, where power is centralized in the top leadership who also suffers from a chronic information deficit. This often leads to a policy control mechanism that fluctuates between very lax and very harsh enforcement. More specifically, I show how government support, firm lobbying and bureaucratic inertia together contributed to a lag in regulating online platforms. When a crisis loomed, the top leadership quickly mobilized all administrative resources and propaganda to initiate a law enforcement campaign against tech giants. However, without strong judicial oversight, aggressive agency interventions create the risk of over-enforcement and administrative abuse. Thus far, China’s reorientation of its policy control has significantly bolstered its regulatory capacity across various fronts including financial, antitrust and data regulation. By exerting greater oversight over platform governance, the government has pressured tech firms to transfer their wealth to their users and the public to combat income inequality. The government’s heavy-handed approach has also afforded it great leverage to nudge tech firms to prioritize on cutting-edge technologies, and to steer them away from foreign stock markets, thus reducing reliance on the West for both technologies and capital. Despite the campaign’s immediate impact, it remains to be seen whether it will bring about lasting changes, especially in light of the persistent lobbying from tech firms and the risk of regulatory capture. At the same time, the volatile policy swing has itself generated risks and uncertainties for both social welfare and global investment, which in turn could cause turmoil to domestic social and financial stability.
敏捷胜于稳定:中国平台经济调控的大逆转
本文发展了一个新的理论框架,通过考虑监管过程中四个关键参与者:最高领导层、监管者、公司和公众之间的战略互动来分析中国的监管治理。通过关注中国在监管平台经济方面的巨大逆转,我认为,中国不稳定的决策风格在其威权治理中根深蒂固,权力集中在高层领导手中,而高层领导也长期遭受信息赤字的困扰。这通常会导致政策控制机制在非常宽松和非常严厉的执行之间波动。更具体地说,我展示了政府支持、公司游说和官僚惰性是如何共同导致网络平台监管滞后的。当危机逼近时,最高领导层迅速调动了所有行政资源和宣传,发起了一场针对科技巨头的执法运动。但是,如果没有强有力的司法监督,激进的机构干预就会造成执法过度和行政滥用的危险。到目前为止,中国对政策控制的重新定位大大增强了其在金融、反垄断和数据监管等各个领域的监管能力。通过加强对平台治理的监督,政府迫使科技公司将财富转移给用户和公众,以解决收入不平等问题。政府的高压手段也为其提供了巨大的杠杆,促使科技公司优先发展尖端技术,并引导它们远离外国股市,从而减少对西方技术和资本的依赖。尽管这场运动产生了立竿见影的影响,但它是否会带来持久的变化仍有待观察,尤其是考虑到科技公司的持续游说和被监管机构捕获的风险。同时,政策波动本身也给社会福利和全球投资带来了风险和不确定性,进而可能给国内社会金融稳定带来动荡。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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