Completing Banking Union

T. Huertas
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引用次数: 8

Abstract

To complete banking union, there should be a single European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS) alongside the single supervisor and the single resolution authority. This would ensure uniformity across the Eurozone and facilitate the removal of barriers to the mobility of liquidity and capital within the single market. That in turn would promote efficiency in the banking sector and in the economy at large — just at the time that the EU needs to boost growth in order to remain competitive with the US and China. The EDIS promise to promptly reimburse insured deposits at a failed bank in the Eurozone should be unconditional. But who will stand behind that commitment? Who is the “E” in EDIS? Is its promise credible, even in a crisis? If a deposit guarantee scheme fails to deliver what people expect, panic would very likely erupt. Instead of strengthening financial stability, deposit insurance could destroy it. Yet this is the risk that current proposals pose. They create the impression that there will be a single deposit guarantee scheme. There will not. Instead, there will be a complex set of liquidity and reinsurance arrangements among Member State schemes. These defects need to be remedied. To do so, we propose creating a European Deposit Insurance Corporation (EDIC) alongside national schemes. For banks that meet EDIC’s strict entry criteria and decide to become members, EDIC will promise to reimburse promptly — in the event the member bank fails — 100 cents on the euro in euro for each euro of insured deposits, regardless of the Eurozone Member State in which the bank is headquartered. In effect, the single deposit guarantee scheme would be created via migration to EDIC rather than mutualisation of existing schemes. This would increase the mobility of capital and liquidity and lead to a convergence of interest rates across the Eurozone. That in turn will improve the effectiveness of monetary policy, foster integration and promote growth.
完成银行业联盟
为了完善银行业联盟,除了单一监管机构和单一处置机构外,还应该有一个单一的欧洲存款保险计划(EDIS)。这将确保整个欧元区的统一性,并有助于消除单一市场内流动性和资本流动的障碍。这反过来将提高银行业和整个经济的效率——而此时欧盟正需要促进增长,以保持对美国和中国的竞争力。EDIS承诺迅速偿还欧元区破产银行的保险存款,这一承诺应该是无条件的。但谁将支持这一承诺?谁是EDIS中的“E”?即使在危机中,它的承诺可信吗?如果存款担保计划不能达到人们的预期,恐慌很可能会爆发。存款保险非但不能加强金融稳定,反而可能破坏它。然而,这正是当前提议所带来的风险。它们给人的印象是,将会有一个单一的存款担保计划。不会有。相反,会员国计划之间将有一套复杂的流动性和再保险安排。这些缺陷需要纠正。为此,我们建议在国家计划的基础上建立一个欧洲存款保险公司(EDIC)。对于符合EDIC严格的准入标准并决定成为成员的银行,EDIC将承诺,在成员银行破产的情况下,对每一欧元保险存款进行100美分的欧元补偿,无论该银行总部位于哪个欧元区成员国。实际上,单一存款担保计划将通过迁移至EDIC而不是现有计划的共同化来创建。这将增加资本和流动性的流动性,并导致整个欧元区的利率趋同。这反过来将提高货币政策的有效性,促进一体化并促进增长。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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