Agency Theory in Mathematics Perspective

Ardiansyah Rasyid
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Abstract

The aim of this paper describes the agency theory in mathematics perspective. The facts are the corporate agents have been given authorization to manage the corporation from the owner as a principal party. The corporate agents can be controlled by the contracts designed through compromising or expected result (outcome) from the principal. The contract has been designed to conduct the agents must provide some efforts to principals. Based on this phenomenon, the mathematics can depict the relationship between the principal and agents. Rationally, the agents usually take the opportunity on inability to monitor in details from the agent’s effort by maximizing the agent’s expected utility from information asymmetry.
数学视角下的代理理论
本文的目的是从数学的角度来描述代理理论。事实是,公司代理人作为公司的主体,已经获得了公司所有人对公司进行管理的授权。公司代理人可以通过对委托人的妥协或预期结果(结果)而设计的合同来控制。合同的设计是为了进行代理人必须向委托人提供一些努力。基于这种现象,数学可以描述委托人和代理人之间的关系。从理性上讲,agent通常会利用信息不对称带来的期望效用最大化,从而利用无法对agent的努力进行详细监控的机会。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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