Irrational Investors and the Corporate Inversion Puzzle

G. Day
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

Despite recent legislative and administrative efforts, U.S. corporations continue to engage in a controversial business strategy known as a “corporate inversion.” A U.S corporation performing an inversion must acquire a foreign corporation and then, through a series of complex transactions, restructures in the foreign corporation’s country. In light of the United States’ burdensome corporate tax code, the inversion process allows formally American corporations to become taxable as a foreign entity, generating sizable tax savings.It is seldom noticed, however, that the inversion trend raises a significant corporate law puzzle regarding the misaligned incentives dividing directors and shareholders. From a corporate director’s point of view, inversions are particularly attractive. This is because the process can be structured to reduce a company’s tax rate while also lessening management’s duty to comply with costly regulatory frameworks. For instance, inverted companies often reincorporate in countries with more management-friendly corporate governance statutes. Likewise, since U.S. exchanges subject foreign incorporated companies to less scrutinizing securities regulations, the inversion process can allow publicly traded companies to minimize costly disclosure, auditing, and corporate governance requirements. But, critically, inversions are puzzling from an investor or shareholder’s perspective. Since corporate regulations are generally thought to protect investors, why would an individual invest in a company that has deliberately sought out and reincorporated in a country that provides minimal shareholder protections? In fact, shareholders often vote in favor of, and thus authorize, the very transactions that limit their ability to acquire information and enforce other shareholder rights. So why is the corporate migration trend booming if individuals should disfavor investing in inverted companies and shareholders should refuse to authorize them? Do individuals value the law? Using an original dataset and empirical analysis, this Article explores why individuals appear to ignore something as important — and as valuable — as the law.
非理性投资者与企业反转之谜
尽管最近在立法和行政方面做出了努力,但美国公司仍在继续采用一种被称为“公司倒置”的有争议的商业策略。进行倒置的美国公司必须收购一家外国公司,然后通过一系列复杂的交易,在外国公司所在国进行重组。鉴于美国繁重的企业税法,倒置过程允许正式的美国公司作为外国实体纳税,从而节省大量税收。然而,很少有人注意到,这种倒置趋势引发了一个重大的公司法难题,即区分董事和股东的不当激励。从公司董事的角度来看,倒置尤其具有吸引力。这是因为这一过程的结构可以降低公司的税率,同时也减轻了管理层遵守成本高昂的监管框架的责任。例如,倒置公司通常在公司治理法规对管理层更友好的国家重新注册。同样,由于美国交易所对外国注册公司的证券监管审查较少,倒置过程可以使上市公司最大限度地减少昂贵的披露、审计和公司治理要求。但关键的是,从投资者或股东的角度来看,反转令人费解。既然公司法规通常被认为是保护投资者的,那么个人为什么要投资一家故意寻找一个对股东保护最少的国家并在那里重新注册的公司呢?事实上,股东经常投票赞成并因此授权那些限制他们获取信息和执行其他股东权利的交易。那么,如果个人不喜欢投资倒置的公司,股东不应该授权他们,为什么企业迁移趋势会蓬勃发展呢?个人是否重视法律?本文使用原始数据集和实证分析,探讨了为什么个人似乎忽略了与法律一样重要和有价值的东西。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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