{"title":"Virtuous Cycles: The Interaction of Public and Private Environmental Governance","authors":"Elodie O. Currier","doi":"10.58948/0738-6206.1881","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The climate crisis has provoked a call for action from all sides. Private governance, public regulation, and individual behavior are all vital pieces of our path toward decarbonization and climate adaptation. Despite this, some scholars and policymakers argue that private environmental governance undermines public efforts to regulate climate harms. This paper draws on existing scholarship in law, policy, and psychology to answer these critiques, proposing four taxonomies of beneficial public-private collaboration on environmental governance. It then applies these models, tracking the shift in U.S. environmental legislation from “polluter pays” to “beneficiary pays” strategies to show a shift from rivalry to collaboration between public and private governance. Tracking examples of this shift, it analyzes the ways that the Inflation Reduction Act and Draft Federal Acquisition Regulation demonstrate the potential of public-private climate partnerships. Finally, it analyzes similar collaborative approaches in international law to show that rather than a “race to the bottom,” the interaction of public and private governance can form virtuous cycles that have the capacity to increase decarbonization efforts across sectors. * J.D. 2023 Vanderbilt Law School. With gratitude to Michael Vandenbergh, Jonathan Gilligan, and Mariah D. Caballero for discussion, thought, and guidance, and to the participants of Prof. Vandenbergh’s Private Environmental Governance class for their insightful questions. Thanks as well to the team at Pace Environmental Law Review— especially Gabriella Mickel--for their thoughtful edits and comments.","PeriodicalId":136205,"journal":{"name":"Pace Environmental Law Review","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Pace Environmental Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.58948/0738-6206.1881","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The climate crisis has provoked a call for action from all sides. Private governance, public regulation, and individual behavior are all vital pieces of our path toward decarbonization and climate adaptation. Despite this, some scholars and policymakers argue that private environmental governance undermines public efforts to regulate climate harms. This paper draws on existing scholarship in law, policy, and psychology to answer these critiques, proposing four taxonomies of beneficial public-private collaboration on environmental governance. It then applies these models, tracking the shift in U.S. environmental legislation from “polluter pays” to “beneficiary pays” strategies to show a shift from rivalry to collaboration between public and private governance. Tracking examples of this shift, it analyzes the ways that the Inflation Reduction Act and Draft Federal Acquisition Regulation demonstrate the potential of public-private climate partnerships. Finally, it analyzes similar collaborative approaches in international law to show that rather than a “race to the bottom,” the interaction of public and private governance can form virtuous cycles that have the capacity to increase decarbonization efforts across sectors. * J.D. 2023 Vanderbilt Law School. With gratitude to Michael Vandenbergh, Jonathan Gilligan, and Mariah D. Caballero for discussion, thought, and guidance, and to the participants of Prof. Vandenbergh’s Private Environmental Governance class for their insightful questions. Thanks as well to the team at Pace Environmental Law Review— especially Gabriella Mickel--for their thoughtful edits and comments.
气候危机引发了各方采取行动的呼吁。私人治理、公共监管和个人行为都是我们走向脱碳和气候适应之路的重要组成部分。尽管如此,一些学者和政策制定者认为,私人环境治理破坏了公共监管气候危害的努力。本文利用法律、政策和心理学方面的现有学术来回答这些批评,提出了环境治理中有益的公私合作的四种分类。然后应用这些模型,跟踪美国环境立法从“污染者付费”到“受益者付费”策略的转变,以显示公私治理从竞争到合作的转变。通过跟踪这一转变的实例,本文分析了《通货膨胀减少法》和《联邦采购条例草案》展示公私气候伙伴关系潜力的方式。最后,本文分析了国际法中类似的合作方式,以表明公共和私人治理的互动可以形成良性循环,从而有能力加强各部门的脱碳努力,而不是“逐底竞争”。*法学博士2023范德比尔特法学院。感谢Michael Vandenbergh、Jonathan Gilligan和Mariah D. Caballero的讨论、思考和指导,以及Vandenbergh教授的私人环境治理课程的参与者提出的富有洞察力的问题。同时感谢《佩斯环境法评论》的团队,尤其是加布里埃拉·米克尔,感谢他们深思熟虑的编辑和评论。