Automated Detection of Password Leakage from Public GitHub Repositories

Abstract

The prosperity of the GitHub community has raised new concerns about data security in public repositories. Practitioners who manage authentication secrets such as textual passwords and API keys in the source code may accidentally leave these texts in the public repositories, resulting in secret leakage. If such leakage in the source code can be automatically detected in time, potential damage would be avoided. With existing approaches focusing on detecting secrets with distinctive formats (e.g., API keys, cryptographic keys in PEM format), textual passwords, which are ubiquitously used for authentication, fall through the crack. Given that textual passwords could be virtually any strings, a naive detection scheme based on regular expression performs poorly. This paper presents PassFinder, an automated approach to effectively detecting password leakage from public repositories that involve various programming languages on a large scale. PassFinder utilizes deep neural networks to unveil the intrinsic characteristics of textual passwords and understand the semantics of the code snippets that use textual passwords for authentication, i.e., the contextual information of the passwords in the source code. Using this new technique, we performed the first large-scale and longitudinal analysis of password leakage on GitHub. We inspected newly uploaded public code files on GitHub for 75 days and found that password leakage is pervasive, affecting over sixty thousand repositories. Our work contributes to a better understanding of password leakage on GitHub, and we believe our technique could promote the security of the open-source ecosystem.