The Role of Autonomy and Reactance for Nudging - Experimentally Comparing Defaults to Recommendations and Mandates

Hendrik Bruns, Grischa Perino
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引用次数: 7

Abstract

Frequently, scholars and decision-makers criticize behavioral public policies for infringing on behavioral autonomy. This paper provides evidence from an online framed field experiment, in which participants encountered a recommendation, a default value, or a mandatory minimum contribution accompanied by varying information on the regulator, before contributing to climate protection and answering an autonomy-related questionnaire. Our findings show that decision-makers perceive defaults as more freedom threatening but not more annoying than recommendations. They perceive mandatory minimum contributions as more threatening to freedom and annoying than defaults. Intrinsic motivation moderates these differences. Framing the regulator as an expert reduces perceived threat to freedom and felt anger, while political source framing has no effect. We also provide suggestive, exploratory, correlational evidence on potential reasons that defaults reduce contributions more than other interventions for highly motivated people. A mediated moderation analysis shows that this is partly because subjects rate the default as more threatening and because this makes them angry. However, the latter finding has important caveats and demands for future research. Findings improve our understanding of how the effectiveness of behavioral interventions depends on decision-makers' perceptions and how this can be leveraged by policymakers.
自主和抗拒在推动中的作用——实验比较默认值与建议和命令
学者和决策者经常批评行为公共政策侵犯行为自主权。本文提供了一个在线框架现场实验的证据,在该实验中,参与者在为气候保护做出贡献并回答与自主相关的问卷之前,遇到了一个建议、一个默认值或一个强制性的最低贡献,并附带了有关监管机构的不同信息。我们的研究结果表明,决策者认为默认设置对自由的威胁更大,但并不比推荐功能更令人讨厌。他们认为强制性的最低捐款比默认捐款更威胁自由,更令人讨厌。内在动机缓和了这些差异。将监管机构定位为专家可以减少对自由的威胁和愤怒,而将政治来源定位则没有效果。我们还提供了暗示性的、探索性的、相关的证据,以证明对于高动机的人来说,违约比其他干预更能减少贡献的潜在原因。一项调解分析显示,部分原因是受试者认为违约更具威胁性,这让他们感到愤怒。然而,后一项发现对未来的研究有重要的警告和要求。研究结果提高了我们对行为干预的有效性如何取决于决策者的看法以及决策者如何利用这一点的理解。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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