Compassionate Moral Realism

Abstract

This chapter reconstructs Schopenhauer’s ethical theory. As with his metaphysical system as a whole, his ethical theory is in part a rejection but also a development of Kant’s ethical theory. The major departure from Kant—and a serious departure indeed—is the jettisoning of the Categorical Imperative and the imperatival form of morality as a whole, for reasons echoed famously by G. E. M. Anscombe, Philippa Foot, and others in the 20th century. In the place of the CI, Schopenhauer puts the feeling of compassion as the foundation of morality, and as the sole criterion for actions of moral worth. What is really novel in Schopenhauer’s ethics, is his synthesis of elements of moral sense theory and a realist foundation he retains from Kantian ethics, a synthesis this chapter calls “compassionate moral realism.”