White Paper: A National Investment Authority

R. Hockett, S. Omarova
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

The contemporary American economy presents a troubling paradox. On the one hand, capital and yield-hungry investors are sufficiently plentiful in the financial system to generate recurrent and devastating asset price bubbles and busts. On the other hand, capital and “patient” investors are so scarce in the nonfinancial and infrastructure sectors that the U.S. has steadily fallen behind its competitors in cutting-edge industries and high quality infrastructure. The explanation for this paradox is not hard to find. Unlike during the nation’s most dynamic and prosperous periods in the past, there is at present no public instrumentality tasked with devising and implementing any ongoing national development strategy, or with directing the capital needed to implement it. No private actor or group of such actors is up to this task. Individual time horizons are too short, and individual capacity to bear long-term risks and capture fair shares of public goods too miniscule, to render such efforts individually rational. Against such a backdrop, it is reasonable for investors to speculate upon price movements in secondary markets rather than invest patiently in primary markets – hence to fuel asset price bubbles and busts rather than real growth. The nation’s economy is accordingly caught in a classic collective action problem – a situation in which multiple acts of individual rationality aggregate into a collectively irrational outcome. Only informed exercises of collective agency can address such problems. This White Paper proposes a form that such agency should take. It calls for a new National Investment Authority (NIA), operationally situated between the Federal Reserve and the Treasury, for the specific purpose of mobilizing private capital in pursuit of long-term investments in both vital infrastructure and the real economy. The NIA reintroduces in modern guise the Hamiltonian national development program of the late 18th century and the Hoover/Roosevelt-era Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) of the mid-20th century. Like those earlier programs, it combines the public and private sectors in partnership. Also like those earlier programs, it reverses the ill-fated latter-day “P3” model of “public capital, private management” in favor of the historically more successful model of “public management, mixed public-and-private capital.” The Paper first lays out the key theoretical and practical justifications for establishing an NIA. It then unpacks the proposal in detail by addressing the specific legal, administrative, and operational choices that will have to be made in connection with its implementation. We lay out and assess the full range of plausible options in connection with each such choice, then conclude and look forward.
白皮书:国家投资局
当代美国经济呈现出一个令人不安的悖论。一方面,在金融体系中,渴望资本和收益的投资者数量足够多,足以产生周期性和破坏性的资产价格泡沫和破裂。另一方面,非金融和基础设施领域的资本和“耐心”投资者是如此稀缺,以至于美国在尖端产业和高质量基础设施方面一直落后于竞争对手。对这个悖论的解释并不难找到。与过去国家最活跃和最繁荣的时期不同,目前没有公共机构负责制定和实施任何正在进行的国家发展战略,或指导实施该战略所需的资本。没有任何私人参与者或此类参与者的团体能够胜任这项任务。个人的时间跨度太短,而个人承担长期风险和获取公平份额的公共产品的能力又太小,因此个人的这种努力是不理性的。在这样的背景下,投资者对二级市场的价格走势进行投机,而不是耐心地在一级市场进行投资,是合理的——从而助长资产价格泡沫和破裂,而不是推动实际增长。因此,国家经济陷入了一个典型的集体行动问题——个人理性的多种行为聚合成集体非理性的结果。只有明智的集体行动才能解决这些问题。本白皮书提出了此类机构应采取的形式。它呼吁建立一个新的国家投资局(NIA),在运作上位于美联储和财政部之间,其具体目的是动员私人资本在重要基础设施和实体经济中进行长期投资。NIA重新引入了18世纪末汉密尔顿的国家发展计划和20世纪中期胡佛/罗斯福时代的重建金融公司(RFC)。与早期的项目一样,它将公共和私营部门结合在一起。也像那些早期的项目一样,它扭转了后来命运多舛的“P3”模式,即“公共资本,私人管理”,转而采用历史上更为成功的“公共管理,公私混合资本”模式。本文首先提出了建立NIA的主要理论和实践依据。然后,通过处理在实施过程中必须做出的具体的法律、行政和操作选择,详细地解析提案。我们列出并评估与每个这样的选择相关的所有可能的选项,然后得出结论并展望未来。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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