M. Rostagno, Carlo Altavilla, Giacomo Carboni, Wolfgang Lemke, Roberto Motto, Arthur Saint Guilhem, Jonathan Yiangou
{"title":"The ECB Strategy and Its Critics","authors":"M. Rostagno, Carlo Altavilla, Giacomo Carboni, Wolfgang Lemke, Roberto Motto, Arthur Saint Guilhem, Jonathan Yiangou","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192895912.003.0003","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"While the EU Treaty established the European Central Bank’s (ECB) primary objective as price stability, defining price stability was left to the ECB’s Governing Council (GC). This chapter shows how the GC chose to formulate an objective that subtly but consciously differed from the standard inflation targeting framework of the time. Rather than expressing a preference for a particular rate of inflation, a ‘target’ that could be changed if circumstances changed, it opted to qualify price stability unconditionally as an inflation rate below 2%. We explain some of the factors behind this decision and describe the process whereby, already in 2003, the ECB’s monetary policy strategy came to be reviewed. The internal debates that informed the ECB’s characteristic ‘below but close to 2%’ objective and ‘two pillar’ strategy are discussed. The chapter also focuses on the ECB’s early critics.","PeriodicalId":118975,"journal":{"name":"Monetary Policy in Times of Crisis","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Monetary Policy in Times of Crisis","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192895912.003.0003","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
While the EU Treaty established the European Central Bank’s (ECB) primary objective as price stability, defining price stability was left to the ECB’s Governing Council (GC). This chapter shows how the GC chose to formulate an objective that subtly but consciously differed from the standard inflation targeting framework of the time. Rather than expressing a preference for a particular rate of inflation, a ‘target’ that could be changed if circumstances changed, it opted to qualify price stability unconditionally as an inflation rate below 2%. We explain some of the factors behind this decision and describe the process whereby, already in 2003, the ECB’s monetary policy strategy came to be reviewed. The internal debates that informed the ECB’s characteristic ‘below but close to 2%’ objective and ‘two pillar’ strategy are discussed. The chapter also focuses on the ECB’s early critics.