TruZ-View: Developing TrustZone User Interface for Mobile OS Using Delegation Integration Model

Kailiang Ying, Priyank Thavai, Wenliang Du
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引用次数: 13

Abstract

When OS and hypervisor are compromised, mobile devices currently provide a hardware protected mode called Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to guarantee the confidentiality and integrity of the User Interface (UI). The present TEE UI solutions adopt a self-contained design model, which provides a fully functional UI stack in the TEE, but they fail to manage one critical design principle of TEE: a small Trusted Computing Base (TCB), which should be more easily verified in comparison to a rich OS. The TCB size of the self-contained model is large as a result of the size of an individual UI stack. To reduce the TCB size of the TEE UI solution, we proposed a novel TEE UI design model called delegation model. To be specific, our design reuses the majority of the rich OS UI stack. Unlike the existing UI solutions protecting 3-dimensional UI processing in the TEE, our design protects the UI solely as a 2-dimensional surface and thus reduces the TCB size. Our system, called TruZ-View, allows application developers to use the rich OS UI development environment to develop TEE UI with consistent UI looks across the TEE and the rich OS. We successfully implemented our design on HiKey board. Moreover, we developed several TEE UI use cases to protect the confidentiality and integrity of UI. We performed a thorough security analysis to prove the security of the delegation UI model. Our real-world application evaluation shows that developers can leverage our TEE UI with few changes to the existing app's UI logic.
TruZ-View:使用委托集成模型开发移动操作系统的TrustZone用户界面
当操作系统和管理程序受到威胁时,移动设备目前提供一种称为可信执行环境(TEE)的硬件保护模式,以保证用户界面(UI)的机密性和完整性。目前的TEE UI解决方案采用了自包含的设计模型,在TEE中提供了一个功能齐全的UI堆栈,但它们未能管理TEE的一个关键设计原则:一个小的可信计算基础(TCB),与一个丰富的操作系统相比,它应该更容易验证。由于单个UI堆栈的大小,自包含模型的TCB大小很大。为了减少TEE UI解决方案的TCB大小,我们提出了一种新的TEE UI设计模型,称为委托模型。具体来说,我们的设计重用了大部分丰富的OS UI堆栈。与现有的在TEE中保护三维UI处理的UI解决方案不同,我们的设计仅将UI保护为二维表面,从而减小了TCB尺寸。我们的系统,称为TruZ-View,允许应用程序开发人员使用富操作系统UI开发环境来开发TEE UI,在TEE和富操作系统之间具有一致的UI外观。我们成功地在HiKey板上实现了我们的设计。此外,我们还开发了几个TEE UI用例来保护UI的机密性和完整性。我们执行了彻底的安全性分析,以证明委托UI模型的安全性。我们的实际应用程序评估表明,开发人员可以利用我们的TEE UI,对现有应用程序的UI逻辑进行很少的更改。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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