Unbelievable: ERISA's Broken Promise [ver. 4.0; August 2021]

Peter J. Wiedenbeck
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Abstract

A central but generally neglected objective of federal regulation of pension and welfare benefit plans was to improve overall economic efficiency by providing workers with accessible and reliable information on which to base their career and financial planning. Simple dissemination of plan terms and financial data (full disclosure) cannot achieve that objective because few workers are equipped with the skills needed to evaluate the costs and benefits of complex retirement saving or health care programs. For that reason ERISA, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, requires curated disclosure of plan-related information: it must be presented a format that is both understandable to the average plan participant and sufficiently complete to empower workers to make best use of the program. The length and complexity of most employee benefit plans creates tension between understandability and completeness, calling for tradeoffs to achieve optimal disclosure. As implemented ERISA’s understandability standard has been jettisoned by plan sponsors seeking protection from liability for failing to tell workers enough. Required plan summaries became unreadable, but plan sponsors could get away with that, both because there was no administrative or judicial enforcement of the understandability standard, and because they could tout the advantages of their benefit plans to workers by means of unregulated informal communications. The demise of understandability is only half the story. Federal courts also degraded the reliability of mandatory disclosures by finding that the obligation to provide reasonably accurate and complete information is enforceable only in a suit for appropriate equitable relief. In consequence, disclosure defects are often presented as estoppel claims, which triggers search for individual detrimental reliance, and translates into widespread under-enforcement of the reliability standard. This article explores the policy dimension of ERISA disclosure law and chronicles the decay of the equilibrium Congress envisioned. From the perspective of workers it is a saga of disappointment, disillusionment, and defeat. The new balance serves the interests of federal courts (reduced caseload) and some employers (increased flexibility), but likely contributes to the increasing standardization of employee benefit plans, decreasing their utility as instruments of workforce management. Far worse, it abandons ERISA’s goal of improved economic performance through better-informed career and financial planning. Yet those costs are not immutable: employers’ liability exposure could be recalibrated by regulation to revive understandability and approach optimal disclosure.
难以置信:ERISA的破碎的承诺。4.0;2021年8月)
联邦管理养恤金和福利计划的一个中心但通常被忽视的目标是通过向工人提供可获得和可靠的信息来提高总体经济效率,以便他们根据这些信息进行职业和财务规划。简单地传播计划条款和财务数据(全面披露)无法实现这一目标,因为很少有工人具备评估复杂的退休储蓄或医疗保健计划的成本和收益所需的技能。因此,1974年颁布的《雇员退休收入保障法》(ERISA)要求有计划地披露与计划相关的信息:它必须以一种既能让普通计划参与者理解,又能让员工充分利用该计划的格式呈现。大多数员工福利计划的长度和复杂性造成了可理解性和完整性之间的紧张关系,要求权衡以实现最佳披露。由于ERISA的可理解性标准已被计划发起人抛弃,他们寻求保护,以免因未能充分告知工人而承担责任。要求的计划摘要变得难以读懂,但计划发起人可以摆脱这种情况,一方面是因为没有行政或司法强制执行可理解性标准,另一方面是因为他们可以通过不受监管的非正式沟通向工人兜售他们的福利计划的优势。可理解性的消亡只是故事的一半。联邦法院还裁定,提供合理准确和完整的信息的义务只有在要求适当衡平法上的救济的诉讼中才能强制执行,从而降低了强制性披露的可靠性。因此,披露缺陷通常以禁止反悔的形式提出,这引发了对个人有害依赖的搜索,并转化为可靠性标准的普遍执行不足。本文探讨了ERISA披露法的政策维度,并记录了国会所设想的平衡的衰落。从工人的角度来看,这是一个充满失望、幻灭和失败的传奇。新的平衡服务于联邦法院(减少案件量)和一些雇主(增加灵活性)的利益,但可能有助于员工福利计划的日益标准化,降低其作为劳动力管理工具的效用。更糟糕的是,它放弃了ERISA的目标,即通过更明智的职业和财务规划来改善经济表现。然而,这些成本并非不可改变:监管机构可以重新调整雇主的责任敞口,以恢复可理解性,并接近最佳披露。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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