Is an experimentalist the same as an engineer in large-scale science?

Abstract

Although physics has long been deemed an experimental science, the experiment has long been considered secondary to theory. This is because postpositivist ideas justified the theory-ladenness of experimental results and, thus, the subordination of the experimentalist to the theorist. However, since the 1970s, the context of a large scientific project has differed from the experiments of the past in that the scientific community divided into subcommunities of theorists, experimentalists, and instrumentalists. By the end of the 20th century, in large accelerator laboratories, it became possible to identify two large tiers of physicists: accelerator physicists and detector ones [1]. Each of these tiers included its own theorists, experimentalists, and instrumentalists. But the role of experimentalists has changed most dramatically. Unlike in the past, when the experimentalist was, in part, both a theorist and an engineer, the contemporary experimentalist is no longer a phenomenal theorist. They are increasingly excluded from theoretical discourse, spending most of their time designing, modeling, and constructing their respective apparatuses, accelerators and detectors. From the end of the 20th century to the beginning of the 21st century, the actual experimental verification of theoretical models occupies a small part of the contemporary experimentalist’s career. Even though they work for high-energy physics (HEP) institutions, they work not on HEP problems directly but rather for HEP. It is the construction of complex detector (or accelerator) units that constitutes their main task and purpose of activity, although existential goals may be more global. In such a situation, the following question arises: should the experimentalist be considered an engineer? In this talk, I will discuss how such differences are related to certain forms of epistemic injustice [2]. By analyzing the scientific practice of large laboratories, I found that the traditional definition of an engineer in the context of large-scale science is incomplete. If an experimentalist holding the status of “scientist” performs their research under the general supervision of a scientist of higher status (such as a university professor) or independently (often called undirected research), then an engineer is rarely accorded such a privilege; their effort is usually rigorously directed by scientists and engineering managers. The latter does not imply any significant research flexibility, such as participation in the analysis of experimental data. Thus, their difference largely comes down to the relationship between power and subordination as well as academic freedoms. The talk will delve into the problems of subaltern communities’ access to highly valuable epistemic practices in HEP. I will argue that the constrained access to epistemic practices violates the existential interests of the HEP community at large.