{"title":"Fresh agricultural products supply chain coordination considering consumers' dual preferences under carbon cap-and-trade mechanism","authors":"Yang Yang, G. Yao","doi":"10.3934/jimo.2022032","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In order to achieve the goal of \"carbon neutral\" development, under the conditions of carbon quota trading policy, consumers' preference for fresh agricultural products and low-carbon preference, this paper discusses the equilibrium decision-making problem of a two-level fresh agricultural products supply chain. And the cost sharing contract and the two-part pricing contract are introduced to coordinate the supply chain. The results show that: the fresh-keeping and low-carbon efforts made by fresh produce suppliers are related to consumers' preferences, fresh-keeping costs, low-carbon costs, fresh-keeping carbon emission factors, and carbon reduction efficiency; under certain conditions, both the cost sharing contract and the two-part pricing contract can coordinate the supply chain of fresh agricultural products; given certain costs and carbon reduction efficiency, which contract retailers choose depends on consumers' consumption preferences and the size of the supplier's initial carbon emissions; when both contracts are valid, it is more advantageous for the retailer to choose two-part pricing contract; the higher the carbon trading price, the better the incentive effect on suppliers' fresh-keeping efforts and low-carbon efforts.","PeriodicalId":347719,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial & Management Optimization","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"9","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Industrial & Management Optimization","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jimo.2022032","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Abstract
In order to achieve the goal of "carbon neutral" development, under the conditions of carbon quota trading policy, consumers' preference for fresh agricultural products and low-carbon preference, this paper discusses the equilibrium decision-making problem of a two-level fresh agricultural products supply chain. And the cost sharing contract and the two-part pricing contract are introduced to coordinate the supply chain. The results show that: the fresh-keeping and low-carbon efforts made by fresh produce suppliers are related to consumers' preferences, fresh-keeping costs, low-carbon costs, fresh-keeping carbon emission factors, and carbon reduction efficiency; under certain conditions, both the cost sharing contract and the two-part pricing contract can coordinate the supply chain of fresh agricultural products; given certain costs and carbon reduction efficiency, which contract retailers choose depends on consumers' consumption preferences and the size of the supplier's initial carbon emissions; when both contracts are valid, it is more advantageous for the retailer to choose two-part pricing contract; the higher the carbon trading price, the better the incentive effect on suppliers' fresh-keeping efforts and low-carbon efforts.