Rationally Inattentive Monetary Policy

Joshua D. Bernstein, Rupal Kamdar
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Abstract

This paper studies optimal monetary policy under rational inattention: the policy maker optimally chooses her information subject to a processing constraint. Our analytical results emphasize how the policy maker’s information choices shape her expectations and the dynamics of the macroeconomy. Paying attention to demand shocks lowers output volatility and causes untracked supply shocks to drive inflation. Because persistent supply shocks have a minor impact on interest rates under full information in the New Keynesian model, the policy maker should focus her limited attention on demand shocks. Improvements in information can explain a declining slope of the empirical Phillips curve.
理性疏忽的货币政策
本文研究了理性忽视下的最优货币政策,即决策者在加工约束下对信息进行最优选择。我们的分析结果强调政策制定者的信息选择如何塑造她的预期和宏观经济的动态。关注需求冲击会降低产出波动性,并导致无法追踪的供应冲击,从而推动通胀。因为在新凯恩斯模型的充分信息下,持续的供给冲击对利率的影响很小,政策制定者应该把有限的注意力集中在需求冲击上。信息的改善可以解释经验菲利普斯曲线斜率的下降。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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