Autonomy and Consent

S. Green
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Abstract

This chapter considers the concepts of sexual autonomy and consent. Sexual autonomy is conceived of as a “bundle” of prima facie rights organized around the idea of securing for the holder various forms of sexual self-determination. There is a distinction between negative sexual autonomy (the right not to engage in, or be subject to, one or another form of sexual conduct) and positive sexual autonomy (the prima facie right to engage in such conduct). Sexual autonomy is violated either when a person is subjected to nonconsensual sex (usually by another individual) or when a person is prevented from engaging in consensual sex (typically by operation of law). To consent to sexual contact is essentially to waive the right not to have such contact. Consent also relieves those to whom it is given of the obligation to refrain from contact. Consent involves a “binary” judgment reflecting various “scalar” qualities (meaning that it is a yes/no kind of judgment that typically turns on the existence of a property that is a matter of degree). Of particular concern here is the distinction between consent and mere “unwantedness.” A fundamental distinction is also made concerning consent in an “attitudinal” or “mental” sense (a state of mind of acquiescence), consent in a “communicative” sense (consent that is conveyed to another in words or actions), and consent in a “prescriptive” sense (consent that is regarded as normatively or legally valid). Further, for consent to be prescriptively valid, it must be voluntary, knowing, and competent.
自主与同意
本章探讨了性自主和性同意的概念。性自主权被认为是围绕着确保持有者的各种形式的性自决的想法而组织起来的一系列表面上的权利。消极的性自主(不从事或受一种或另一种形式的性行为的权利)和积极的性自主(从事这种行为的初步权利)之间是有区别的。当一个人遭受非自愿的性行为(通常是由另一个人)或当一个人被阻止参与自愿的性行为(通常是通过法律运作)时,性自主权就被侵犯了。同意性接触本质上就是放弃不进行这种接触的权利。同意也免除了那些得到同意的人避免接触的义务。“同意”涉及反映各种“标量”性质的“二元”判断(这意味着它是一种“是”或“否”的判断,通常是对属性是否存在的程度问题的判断)。这里特别值得关注的是同意和仅仅是“不想要”之间的区别。对于“态度”或“精神”意义上的同意(一种默许的心理状态)、“沟通”意义上的同意(以言语或行动向他人传达的同意)和“规定”意义上的同意(被视为规范或法律上有效的同意),也有一个基本的区别。此外,为了使同意在规定上有效,它必须是自愿的、知情的和有能力的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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