Judicial Review in French Competition Law and Economic Regulation - A Post-Commission v. Tetra Laval Assessment

N. Petit, Rabeux Louise
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引用次数: 8

Abstract

The present article seeks to assess the degree of judicial scrutiny performed by French courts when reviewing National Competition Authorities ("NCAs") and National Regulatory Authorities ("NRAs") decisions in the aftermath of the seminal ruling handed down by the European Court of Justice (the "ECJ") in Commission vs. Tetra Laval. In this judgment, the ECJ considered that the European Community ("EC") courts should refrain from engaging in a de novo assessment of the decisions adopted by the European Commission (the "Commission"), when enforcing EC competition rules and, arguably, in other fields such as sector-specific regulation. In light of the general duty of Member States to fully ensure the effet utile of EC legislation, the question arises whether the Tetra Laval standard of judicial review promoted by the ECJ has been endorsed by national courts, when reviewing decisions of NCAs and NRAs. Indeed, the equally ranking principle of procedural autonomy implies that national legal orders should remain free to decide the degree of judicial scrutiny applicable to decisions from national regulators. The present article examines whether the French courts have drawn inspiration from the ECJ's moderate standard of judicial review in Commission vs. Tetra Laval, or if, on the contrary, a stricter standard prevails under French law. To that end, it is divided into four sections, which follow a chronological approach. The first section provides an overview of the specificities of the French judicial review system in the pre-Tetra Laval world (I). As in the French judicial system many courts have jurisdiction over regulators' decisions, it seeks to clarify who judges the regulators, the judicial remedies available to regulated entities and the degree of judicial scrutiny traditionally exercised over regulators' decisions in the pre-Tetra Laval period. The second section offers a brief analysis of Commission vs. Tetra Laval where the Court introduced a new standard of judicial review different from that found in previous case-law. It argues that the ECJ's judgment marks a striking piece of judicial deference towards regulators' decisions (II). The third section determines whether the Tetra Laval judgment has impacted on the degree of judicial scrutiny applied in practice by French courts when reviewing regulators' decisions in the areas of competition law (including merger control and antitrust) and sector-specific regulation (III). We find that French courts have not followed the Tetra Laval ruling in the area of competition law, and, to the contrary, that they scrutinize intensively the procedural aspects but also the merits of the NCAs' decisions. By contrast, French courts display a much higher degree of deference with respect to NRAs' decisions in the field of sector-specific regulation. The fourth section offers a brief conclusion (IV).
法国竞争法和经济法规的司法审查-委员会诉利乐伐案后的评估
本文旨在评估法国法院在欧洲法院(“ECJ”)在委员会诉利乐拉瓦尔案中作出的开创性裁决后,在审查国家竞争管理机构(“NCAs”)和国家监管机构(“NRAs”)的决定时所进行的司法审查程度。在这一判决中,欧洲法院认为欧共体(“欧共体”)法院在执行欧共体竞争规则时,以及在其他领域(如特定部门的规定),应避免对欧盟委员会(“委员会”)通过的决定进行从头评估。鉴于会员国有充分确保欧共体立法的效力的一般义务,在审查国家法院和国家审查机构的决定时,出现了一个问题,即欧洲法院提倡的利乐伐司法审查标准是否得到国家法院的赞同。事实上,同样重要的程序自治原则意味着,国家法律秩序应继续自由决定适用于国家监管机构的决定的司法审查程度。本文考察了法国法院是否从欧洲法院在委员会诉利乐拉瓦尔案中采用的温和的司法审查标准中汲取了灵感,或者相反,法国法律是否采用了更严格的标准。为此,全书分为四个部分,按时间顺序排列。第一部分概述了前利乐伐时代法国司法审查制度的特殊性(1)。正如在法国司法系统中,许多法院对监管机构的决定具有管辖权一样,它试图澄清由谁来评判监管机构、被监管实体可获得的司法救济以及在前利乐伐时期对监管机构的决定传统上行使的司法审查程度。第二部分简要分析了委员会诉利乐拉瓦尔案,法院在该案中引入了一种不同于以往判例法中发现的新的司法审查标准。它认为,欧洲法院的判决标志着对监管机构决定的司法尊重(II)。第三部分确定利乐伐的判决是否影响了法国法院在审查监管机构在竞争法(包括合并控制和反垄断)和特定部门监管领域的决定时在实践中应用的司法审查程度(III)。我们发现法国法院没有遵循利乐伐在相反,他们仔细审查了程序方面,但也审查了NCAs决定的优点。相比之下,法国法院对国家监管机构在特定行业监管领域的决定表现出更高程度的尊重。第四部分是一个简短的结论(四)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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