S. Mazzone, M. Pagnozzi, Aristide Fattori, Alessandro Reina, A. Lanzi, D. Bruschi
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引用次数: 5
Abstract
The kernel is the core of any operating system, and its security is of vital importance. A vulnerability, in any of its parts, compromises the whole system security model. Unprivileged users that find such vulnerabilities can easily crash the attacked system, or obtain administration privileges. In this paper we propose LynxFuzzer, a framework to test kernel extensions, i.e., the dynamically loadable components of Mac OS X kernel. To overcome the challenges posed by interacting with kernel-level software, LynxFuzzer includes a bare-metal hardware-assisted hypervisor, that allows to seamlessly inspect the state of a running kernel and its components. We implemented and evaluated LynxFuzzer on Mac OS X Mountain Lion and we obtained unexpected results: we indivuated 6 bugs in 17 kernel extensions we tested, thus proving the usefulness and effectiveness of our framework.
内核是任何操作系统的核心,其安全性至关重要。任何部分的漏洞都会危及整个系统安全模型。发现此类漏洞的非特权用户可以很容易地使受攻击的系统崩溃,或者获得管理特权。在本文中,我们提出了LynxFuzzer,一个测试内核扩展的框架,即Mac OS X内核的可动态加载组件。为了克服与内核级软件交互所带来的挑战,LynxFuzzer包括一个裸机硬件辅助管理程序,它允许无缝地检查正在运行的内核及其组件的状态。我们在Mac OS X Mountain Lion上实现和评估了LynxFuzzer,并获得了意想不到的结果:我们在测试的17个内核扩展中找出了6个bug,从而证明了我们框架的有用性和有效性。