The Corporation as a 'Real' Constitutional Person

Jonathan A. Marcantel
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Although the opinion facially decided the constitutionality of a nuanced provision of campaign finance reform, the Court held that corporations are protected by the First Amendment, and in the process, reinvigorated the perennial, trifurcated break in corporate doctrinal discussion between concessionary theorists, aggregate theorists, and real entity theorists. More specifically, the majority, invoking the “original understanding” of the Constitution, appears to have adopted a real entity theory of the corporation. Nevertheless, the majority provided little contemporaneous documentary evidence to support its position - a gap that exists in the academic literature as well. This Article fills a portion of that gap by analyzing documents contemporaneous to the drafting and ratification of the Constitution. Specifically, this Article defines the contemporaneous meaning of the words “people,” “person,” and “citizen” - the entities the Constitution explicitly attempts to protect - by examining the manner the drafters and ratifiers used those words during the Constitutional Convention, the ratification debates, the debates surrounding the Bill of Rights, and the debates surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment. Using those documents as the foundation for the analysis, this Article then argues that the manner the drafters and ratifiers used those terms during the debates is inconsistent with the concept of corporations as real constitutional entities. Part II of this Article briefly discusses each of the traditional three constitutional theories of the corporation, beginning with concessionary theory and then moving to both aggregate theory and real entity theory. 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引用次数: 3

Abstract

For two centuries, jurists and corporate scholars have struggled with creating a singular, global definition explaining the essence of corporate existence and its relationship to the law. This challenge has been particularly difficult within the constitutional realm, where small movements in doctrinal theory have the potential for wide impact. Earlier this year, the United States Supreme Court reignited that discussion when it delivered the opinion in Citizens’ United v. FEC. Although the opinion facially decided the constitutionality of a nuanced provision of campaign finance reform, the Court held that corporations are protected by the First Amendment, and in the process, reinvigorated the perennial, trifurcated break in corporate doctrinal discussion between concessionary theorists, aggregate theorists, and real entity theorists. More specifically, the majority, invoking the “original understanding” of the Constitution, appears to have adopted a real entity theory of the corporation. Nevertheless, the majority provided little contemporaneous documentary evidence to support its position - a gap that exists in the academic literature as well. This Article fills a portion of that gap by analyzing documents contemporaneous to the drafting and ratification of the Constitution. Specifically, this Article defines the contemporaneous meaning of the words “people,” “person,” and “citizen” - the entities the Constitution explicitly attempts to protect - by examining the manner the drafters and ratifiers used those words during the Constitutional Convention, the ratification debates, the debates surrounding the Bill of Rights, and the debates surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment. Using those documents as the foundation for the analysis, this Article then argues that the manner the drafters and ratifiers used those terms during the debates is inconsistent with the concept of corporations as real constitutional entities. Part II of this Article briefly discusses each of the traditional three constitutional theories of the corporation, beginning with concessionary theory and then moving to both aggregate theory and real entity theory. This Part additionally discusses the Court’s decision in Citizens United and the majority’s holding that corporations are real entities for constitutional purposes. Part III analyzes whether the majority’s decision is consistent with documents contemporaneous to the Constitution and its amendments in four sections. Section one discusses the language contained within the Constitution and more specifically the entities explicitly entitled to protection - “people,” “persons,” and “citizens.” This section then analyzes the language used during the Constitutional Convention, the language used in the Federalist Papers, the language used in contemporaneous state organic documents, and the definitions in contemporaneous dictionaries to determine the meaning of those words at the time the Constitution was drafted. Section two again focuses on the words “people,” “citizens,” and “persons” and their usage by the ratifiers during the ratification debates. Section three then turns to the Bill of Rights and discusses the entities explicitly protected in the language of the amendments - “people” and “persons.” This section analyzes the language the drafters and ratifiers of the Bill of Rights used to determine the contemporaneous meaning of those words. Additionally, this section analyzes the passive clauses of the Bill of Rights - the clauses that do not contain a subject - in combination with the language of the drafters and ratifiers of the amendments to determine the meaning of those clauses, focusing specific attention on the First, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments. Finally, section four analyzes the Fourteenth Amendment and the terms the Amendment explicitly protects - “persons” and “citizens.” The section then defines those terms using the debates of the Fourteenth Amendment as a guide. Taking all four sections together, this Part ultimately concludes that the drafters and ratifiers of the Constitution, and its amendments, used the words "people," "person," and "citizens" in a manner inconsistent with the notion of corporations as real constitutional entities.
公司作为“真正的”宪法人
两个世纪以来,法学家和公司学者一直在努力创造一个单一的、全球性的定义,以解释公司存在的本质及其与法律的关系。这一挑战在宪法领域尤其困难,因为教义理论的小变动有可能产生广泛的影响。今年早些时候,美国最高法院在“公民联盟诉联邦选举委员会”一案中发表意见时,再次引发了这一讨论。虽然该意见表面上决定了一项微妙的竞选资金改革条款的合宪性,但法院认为公司受到第一修正案的保护,并在此过程中,重新激活了长期存在的,在让步理论家,集合理论家和真正实体理论家之间的公司理论讨论中的三重分裂。更具体地说,大多数人援引宪法的“原始理解”,似乎采用了公司的真正实体理论。然而,大多数人几乎没有提供同时代的文献证据来支持他们的立场——这一差距也存在于学术文献中。本文通过分析与宪法起草和批准同时进行的文件来填补这一空白的一部分。具体而言,本文通过考察起草者和批准者在制宪会议、批准辩论、围绕《权利法案》的辩论和围绕《第十四修正案》的辩论中使用这些词的方式,定义了“人民”、“个人”和“公民”等词的同时代含义——宪法明确试图保护的实体。本文以这些文件作为分析的基础,然后论证起草者和批准者在辩论中使用这些术语的方式与公司作为真正的宪法实体的概念不一致。本文第二部分对传统的三种公司构成理论分别进行了简要的论述,从特许公司理论入手,进而讨论了总量公司理论和实体公司理论。本部分还讨论了最高法院对“联合公民”一案的判决,以及多数人认为公司是符合宪法目的的真实实体。第三部分分四节分析多数人的决定是否与与宪法及其修正案同时代的文件一致。第一节讨论了宪法中包含的语言,更具体地说,是明确有权受到保护的实体——“人民”、“个人”和“公民”。本节接着分析制宪会议期间使用的语言、《联邦党人文集》中使用的语言、同时期州有机文件中使用的语言以及同时期词典中的定义,以确定这些词在起草宪法时的含义。第二节再次关注“人民”、“公民”和“人”等词,以及批准人在批准辩论中对这些词的使用。然后,第三节转向《权利法案》,讨论修正案语言中明确保护的实体——“人民”和“个人”。本节分析《权利法案》的起草者和批准者用来确定这些词在当时的含义的语言。此外,本节结合修正案起草者和批准者的语言,分析《权利法案》的被动条款(即不包含主题的条款),以确定这些条款的含义,特别关注第一、第六和第七修正案。最后,第四节分析第十四修正案及其明确保护的术语——“人”和“公民”。然后,本节以第十四修正案的辩论为指导,对这些术语进行了定义。将所有四个部分结合起来,本部分最终得出结论,宪法的起草者和批准者及其修正案使用“人民”、“个人”和“公民”等词的方式与公司作为真正的宪法实体的概念不一致。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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