Determining the Optimal Length of Regulatory Guarantee: A Length-of-contract Auction

IF 3.8 2区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Economic Journal Pub Date : 2017-10-24 DOI:10.1111/ecoj.12405

Thomas Greve, Michael G. Pollitt

引用次数: 5

Abstract

We present an auction design to be used in the area of procurement that allows the length of the regulatory funding period to be determined via an auction. It allows bidders to submit bids against a payment for periods of varying lengths, say 25 and 30 years, instead of a fixed 20-year contract. This can be desirable for securing more favourable terms in financial markets. It yields efficiency and delivers the optimal length of contract, defined as where social value is maximised. The auction is applicable to any infrastructure investment such as energy, transportation or any area that uses contracts.

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确定监管担保的最优期限:合同期限拍卖

我们提出了一种用于采购领域的拍卖设计，该设计允许通过拍卖来确定监管资助期的长度。它允许竞标者根据不同期限的付款提交投标，比如25年和30年，而不是固定的20年合同。这对于在金融市场上获得更有利的条款可能是可取的。它带来了效率，并提供了最优的合同期限，定义为社会价值最大化。拍卖适用于任何基础设施投资，如能源、交通或任何使用合同的领域。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Economic Journal ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

6.60

自引率

3.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Economic Journal is the Royal Economic Society''s flagship title, and is one of the founding journals of modern economics. Over the past 125 years the journal has provided a platform for high quality and imaginative economic research, earning a worldwide reputation excellence as a general journal publishing papers in all fields of economics for a broad international readership. It is invaluable to anyone with an active interest in economic issues and is a key source for professional economists in higher education, business, government and the financial sector who want to keep abreast of current thinking in economics.