The Methodological Commitments of Contemporary Contract Theory

Jody S. Kraus
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Autonomy and economic theories of contract seem to provide incompatible accounts of contract law. In this Chapter, I argue that what appear to be first-order disagreements over particular contract doctrines are really implicit second-order disagreements reflecting the divergent methodological commitments of autonomy and economic theories. I argue that autonomy theories accord priority to the normative project of justifying existing contract doctrine, treat contract law as consisting in the plain meaning of doctrine, require contract theory to explain the distinctive character of contract law, and take the ex post perspective in adjudication. In contrast, economic theories accord priority to the positive project of explaining existing contract theory, treat contract law as consisting in the outcomes of cases, strive to explain away, rather than explain, the distinctiveness of contract law, and take the ex ante perspective in adjudication. I demonstrate how the apparent disagreements between autonomy contract theories, such as Charles Fried's and Peter Benson's theories, and economic theories, such as Charles Goetz and Robert Scott's contract theory, reflect these opposing methodological commitments, rather than direct disagreements over particular contract doctrines. I also demonstrate that these theories' opposing perspectives in adjudication do not, as Richard Craswell has famously argued, necessarily disable all autonomy theories from addressing the problem of contractual gaps. I conclude that genuine progress on the first-order questions of contract law can be made only by first identifying and then adjudicating the methodological disagreements between different kinds of contract theories.
当代契约理论的方法论承诺
契约的自治理论和经济理论似乎提供了不相容的合同法解释。在本章中,我认为,对特定契约理论的一阶分歧实际上是隐含的二阶分歧,反映了自治和经济理论的不同方法论承诺。笔者认为,自治理论优先考虑证明现有合同原则的规范性工程,将合同法视为构成原则的简单意义,要求契约理论解释合同法的独特特征,并在裁决中采取事后视角。相比之下,经济理论优先考虑解释现有合同理论的积极项目,将合同法视为案件结果的组成部分,努力解释而不是解释合同法的独特性,并在裁决中采取事前视角。我论证了自治契约理论(如查尔斯·弗里德和彼得·本森的理论)与经济理论(如查尔斯·戈茨和罗伯特·斯科特的契约理论)之间的明显分歧是如何反映了这些对立的方法论承诺,而不是对特定契约理论的直接分歧。我还证明了这些理论在裁决中的对立观点,并不像理查德·克拉斯韦尔(Richard Craswell)著名的论点那样,必然使所有自治理论无法解决合同空白的问题。我的结论是,合同法一级问题的真正进展,只能通过首先识别,然后裁决不同类型的合同理论之间的方法论分歧来实现。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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