Bank Restructuring without Government Intervention

M. Lucchetta, Bruno Parigi, J. Rochet
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

When a bank is burdened with Non Performing Loans, an underinvestment problem may arise. Banking Authorities often take the initiative to segregate these Non Performing Loans into a Bad Bank (BB), so that the remaining part of the bank, the Good Bank, finds it profitable to make new loans. These BBs typically involve an injection of public funds. We propose a different type of bank break up that does not require any government subsidy. The idea is to give to the bank’s shareholders the option to create a BB on their own, and finance it ex-ante by requiring the bank to issue a bail-inable bond that is drawn down when the option is exercised. No tax payer money is involved. Such a restructuring differs from the bail-in regimes in the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive in the EU and the Dodd-Frank Act in the USA in that it recognizes to the bank’s shareholders the information rents that result from their private information on the bank’s legacy loans.
没有政府干预的银行重组
当银行背负着不良贷款时,就会出现投资不足的问题。银行当局经常主动将这些不良贷款分离成坏账银行(BB),以便银行的其余部分,即好银行,发现发放新贷款是有利可图的。这些论坛通常涉及公共资金的注入。我们提出了一种不需要任何政府补贴的不同类型的银行拆分。这个想法是给银行股东自己创建BB的选择权,并通过要求银行发行可担保债券的方式预先融资,该债券在行使选择权时被赎回。不涉及纳税人的钱。这种重组不同于欧盟的《银行复苏与处置指令》(Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive)和美国的《多德-弗兰克法案》(Dodd-Frank Act)中的纾困机制,因为它向银行股东承认了他们对银行遗留贷款的私人信息所产生的信息租金。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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