PELIBATAN DEWAN PERWAKILAN RAKYAT DALAM PENGISIAN JABATAN HAKIM AGUNG DAN HAKIM KONSTITUSI

Sri Hastuti Puspitasari
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

One of the reasons to involve the House of Representatives to take the position of Chief Justice and Constitutional Judges after the amendment to the 1945 Constitution is the phenomenon of the House’s empowerment in the Indonesian constitutional system during the transition to democracy through the amendment. Such involvement can potentially cause problems, for example, the decisive authority of the  House  of  Representatives  in  selecting  the  Chief  Justice  and  constitutional  judges,  leading  to politicization problem. This research formulates the following issues, first, the reasons for involving the House of Representatives in filling in the position of Chief Justice and Constitutional Judges. Second, whether the involvement is in accordance with the principle of separation of power as well as check and balance. This study is normative research with secondary data sources derived from legal materials, with  conceptual,  case,  and  statutory  approaches.  The  results  show  that  first,  the  involvement  of  the House of Representatives for Chief Justice and Constitutional Judges positions is part of the process of democracy beginning after the New Order transition period. Second, The involvement is also a deviationfrom the principle of separation of power, and such practice does not even reflect the principle of check and balance because the House of Representatives dominates all the selection processes.
在1945年宪法修正案之后,让众议院担任首席大法官和宪法法官的原因之一是众议院在印度尼西亚宪法制度中通过修正案向民主过渡的现象。这种介入可能会产生问题,例如众议院在选择首席大法官和宪法法官方面的决定性权力,导致政治化问题。本研究主要阐述了以下几个问题:第一,让众议院参与首席大法官和宪法法官人选的原因。第二,这种介入是否符合三权分立和制衡的原则。本研究是规范性研究,从法律材料中获得二手数据来源,采用概念、案例和法定方法。结果表明:第一,众议院对首席大法官和宪法法官职位的参与是新秩序过渡期后开始的民主进程的一部分。其次,这种介入也是对权力分立原则的背离,这种做法甚至没有体现制衡原则,因为众议院主导了所有的选举过程。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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