Berle and Means Debate

R. Tripathy
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Abstract

This paper discuss about the debate between berle and means on the basis of separation of ownership and control in corporate world to form good governance. Berle and Means researched the consequences of ownership and control being separate. As businesses grow and shareholders increase in number, any shareholdings that directors have will be a proportionally smaller capital stake. Directors' income will derive mostly from return on their labor as directors, not from their capital investment. If their motivation is purely pecuniary.Berle and Means argued that the structure of corporate law in theUnited States in the 1930s enforced the separation of ownership and control because the corporate person formally owns a corporate entity even while shareholders own shares in the corporate entity and elect corporate directors who control the company's activities. Compared to the traditional notion of property, say over one's laptop or bicycle, the functioning of modern company law “has destroyed the unity that we commonly call property”. This occurred for a number of reasons, foremost being the dispersal of shareholding ownership in big corporations: the typical shareholder is uninterested in the day to day affairs of the company, yet thousands of people like him or her make up the majority of owners throughout the economy. The result is that those who are directly interested in day to day affairs, the management and the directors, have the ability to manage the resources of companies to their own advantage without effective shareholder scrutiny.
Berle和Means辩论
本文讨论了在企业所有权与控制权分离的基础上,企业形成良好治理的方式之争。Berle和Means研究了所有权和控制权分离的后果。随着企业的发展和股东数量的增加,董事所持有的任何股份都将按比例减少。董事的收入主要来源于董事的劳动报酬,而不是资本投资。如果他们的动机纯粹是金钱。Berle和Means认为,20世纪30年代美国的公司法结构强制将所有权和控制权分离,因为公司法人正式拥有公司实体,而股东拥有公司实体的股份并选举控制公司活动的公司董事。与传统的财产概念(比如笔记本电脑或自行车)相比,现代公司法的运作“破坏了我们通常称之为财产的统一性”。发生这种情况的原因有很多,最重要的是大公司股权的分散:典型的股东对公司的日常事务不感兴趣,然而在整个经济中,成千上万像他或她这样的人构成了大多数所有者。其结果是,那些对日常事务直接感兴趣的人,即管理层和董事,有能力在没有股东有效监督的情况下,为自己的利益管理公司的资源。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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