Helping or Hindering?: How Browser Extensions Undermine Security

Shubham Agarwal
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Abstract

Browser extensions enhance the functionality of native Web applications on the client side. They provide a rich end-user experience by utilizing feature-rich JavaScript APIs, otherwise inaccessible for native applications. However, prior studies suggest that extensions may degrade the client-side security to execute their operations, such as by altering the DOM, executing untrusted scripts in the applications' context, and performing other security-critical operations for the user. In this study, we instead focus on extensions that tamper with the security headers between the client-server exchange, thereby undermining the security guarantees that these headers provide to the application. To this end, we present our automated analysis framework to detect such extensions by leveraging static and dynamic analysis techniques. We statically identify extensions with the permission to modify headers and then instrument the dangerous APIs to investigate their runtime behavior with respect to modifying headers in-flight. We then use our framework to analyze the three snapshots of the Chrome extension store from Jun 2020, Feb 2021, and Jan 2022. In doing so, we detect 1,129 distinct extensions that interfere with security-related request/response headers and discuss the associated security implications. The impact of our findings is aggravated by the extensions, with millions of installations dropping critical security headers like Content-Security-Policy or X-Frame-Options.
帮助还是阻碍?:浏览器扩展如何破坏安全性
浏览器扩展增强了客户端本地Web应用程序的功能。它们通过利用功能丰富的JavaScript api提供丰富的终端用户体验,否则原生应用程序无法访问。然而,先前的研究表明,扩展可能会降低执行其操作的客户端安全性,例如通过更改DOM、在应用程序上下文中执行不受信任的脚本以及为用户执行其他安全关键操作。在本研究中,我们转而关注那些篡改客户端-服务器交换之间的安全标头的扩展,从而破坏了这些标头为应用程序提供的安全保证。为此,我们提出了自动化分析框架,通过利用静态和动态分析技术来检测此类扩展。我们静态地识别具有修改头文件权限的扩展,然后检测危险的api,以调查它们在运行时修改头文件的行为。然后,我们使用我们的框架来分析2020年6月,2021年2月和2022年1月Chrome扩展商店的三个快照。在此过程中,我们检测了1129个不同的扩展,这些扩展干扰了与安全相关的请求/响应头,并讨论了相关的安全含义。我们的发现的影响被扩展所加剧,数以百万计的安装丢失了关键的安全头,如Content-Security-Policy或X-Frame-Options。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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