Direct Democracy Upside Down

Abstract

Over the last decades, provisions for direct democracy mechanisms increasingly have been added to new constitutions and more questions have been decided by referendum votes around the world in consolidated, new, or reestablished democracies. These mechanisms are usually classified according to who initiated the call: mandatory referendum (by law), referendum by legislatures and office holders (top-down), or citizen referendum and initiative (bottom-up). While the first and the second types have been studied in a comparative approach, the third remains an issue for case studies mainly (e.g., Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and Italy). However, despite incomplete research, bottom-up direct democracy is seen as a way for citizenry to exercise veto power (refusing laws or constitutional amendments) or to innovate (propose bills). This essay challenges this common assumption by analyzing all the experiences of bottom-up direct democracy at the national level worldwide (1874-2009). It is suggested that even so-called bottom-up referendums could be used (a) to concentrate power, (b) to serve as a partisan strategy, and, rather exceptionally, (c) to empower citizens and civil society. While the first type shows a similar pattern to top-down direct democracy in hybrid regimes or nonconsolidated democracies, and the second type works as a political party’s strategy to increase membership and votes, only the last type could reinvigorate democracy, although to what extent this is happening needs further research.