The Future of Securities Litigation

R. Booth
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引用次数: 6

Abstract

In this article, I analyze the implications of the Supreme Court's 2008 decision in Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta. The case arose as a result of a scheme to increase reported advertising earnings of a struggling cable television company involving two suppliers who agreed to sell set-top boxes to the cable company at inflated prices and then to use the excess to buy advertising from the cable company. While it seems clear that the cable company was guilty of securities fraud under SEC Rule 10b-5, the issue in Stoneridge was whether the suppliers could be held liable for damages in a private action as participants in the fraud. The Court ruled that because the plaintiffs did not rely on any statement made by the suppliers, the case should be dismissed. Although the circuit courts were split on the question, it would have been easy for the Supreme Court to rule that the allegations amounted to a claim of aiding and abetting and were prohibited by precedent as codified by Congress. The question is why did the Court go out of its way to base its holding on lack of reliance? The ruling is all the more curious because it also required the Court to explain that conduct may nonetheless be deceiving. As I argue in this piece, in light of other recent decisions, the answer appears to be that the Court is particularly interested in causation as it relates to securities fraud. This suggests that the Court may be receptive to arguments that securities fraud under Rule 10b-5 is a zero-sum game and that for diversified investors - the vast majority of investors - the costs of securities litigation are a deadweight loss that reduces portfolio returns because the company pays. Thus, diversified investors would prefer a rule that prohibits securities fraud class actions except in cases in which officers or agents of the corporation have appropriated or reduced stockholder wealth. And in such cases they would prefer that the action be prosecuted as a derivative action - or an action by the corporation - to recover from the wrongdoers for the benefit of the corporation. In short, because securities fraud causes no net harm to most investors, Stoneridge may signal that the Supreme Court is inclined to reconsider whether there exists a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5 by disgruntled investors against non-trading issuers.
证券诉讼的未来
在这篇文章中,我分析了最高法院在2008年斯通里奇投资伙伴诉科学亚特兰大案中判决的影响。此案的起因是,一家陷入困境的有线电视公司的一项广告收入报告计划涉及两家供应商,他们同意以虚高的价格向有线电视公司出售机顶盒,然后用多余的钱从有线电视公司购买广告。虽然根据美国证券交易委员会10b-5规则,有线电视公司显然犯有证券欺诈罪,但斯通里奇案的问题是,供应商是否可以作为欺诈参与者在私人诉讼中承担损害赔偿责任。法院裁定,由于原告没有依据供应商的任何陈述,此案应被驳回。尽管巡回法院在这个问题上存在分歧,但最高法院很容易裁定,这些指控相当于协助和教唆的指控,并被国会编纂的先例所禁止。问题是,法院为什么要以缺乏信赖为依据作出裁决?这项裁决更令人好奇的是,它还要求法院解释,尽管如此,行为也可能是欺骗性的。正如我在这篇文章中所论证的那样,根据最近的其他判决,答案似乎是法院对与证券欺诈有关的因果关系特别感兴趣。这表明,法院可能会接受以下论点,即规则10b-5下的证券欺诈是一种零和游戏,对于多元化投资者(绝大多数投资者)来说,证券诉讼的成本是一种无谓损失,会降低投资组合的回报,因为公司要支付费用。因此,多元化的投资者更喜欢禁止证券欺诈集体诉讼的规则,除非公司的管理人员或代理人挪用或减少了股东的财富。在这种情况下,他们更倾向于将诉讼作为派生诉讼起诉——或者公司的诉讼——为了公司的利益,从不法行为者那里获得赔偿。简而言之,由于证券欺诈对大多数投资者没有造成净损害,斯通里奇案可能表明,最高法院倾向于重新考虑是否存在心怀不满的投资者根据规则10b-5对非交易发行人提起私人诉讼的原因。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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