Edge Weighted Online Windowed Matching

I. Ashlagi, Maximilien Burq, Chinmoy Dutta, Patrick Jaillet, A. Saberi, C. Sholley
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引用次数: 59

Abstract

Motivated by applications from ride-sharing and kidney exchange, we study the problem of matching agents who arrive at a marketplace over time and leave after d time periods. Agents can only be matched while they are present in the marketplace. Each pair of agents can yield a different match value, and the planner's goal is to maximize the total value over a finite time horizon. First we study the case in which vertices arrive in an adversarial order. We provide a randomized 1/4-competitive algorithm building on a result by Feldman et al. [14] and Lehmann et al. [23]. We extend the model to the case in which departure times are drawn independently from a distribution with non-decreasing hazard rate, for which we establish a 1/8-competitive algorithm. When the arrival order is chosen uniformly at random, we show that a batching algorithm, which computes a maximum-weighted matching every (d+1) periods, is $0.279$-competitive.
边缘加权在线窗口匹配
受乘车共享和肾脏交换应用的激励,我们研究了随着时间的推移到达市场并在d段时间后离开的匹配代理问题。代理商只有在市场上出现时才能匹配。每一对代理可以产生不同的匹配值,计划者的目标是在有限的时间范围内最大化总价值。首先,我们研究了顶点以对抗顺序到达的情况。我们基于Feldman等人[14]和Lehmann等人[23]的结果提供了一个随机的1/4竞争算法。我们将模型扩展到出发时间独立于危险率不减小的分布的情况,为此我们建立了1/8竞争算法。当均匀随机选择到达顺序时,我们证明了每(d+1)个周期计算最大加权匹配的批处理算法具有$0.279$竞争性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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