The Proper Scope of Behavioural Law and Economics

C. Engel
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Behavioural law and economics applies the conceptual tools of behavioural economics to the analysis of legal problems and legal intervention. These models, and the experiments to test them, assume an institution-free state of nature. In modern societies, the law’s subjects never see this state of nature. However, a rich arrangement of informal and formal institutions creates generalised trust. If individuals are sufficiently confident that nothing too detrimental will happen, they are freed up to interact with strangers as if they were in a state of nature. This willingness dramatically reduces transaction cost and enables division of labour. If generalised trust can be assumed, simple economic models are appropriate, but they must be behavioural, since otherwise individuals would not want to run the risk of interaction.
行为法与经济学的适当范围
行为法律与经济学将行为经济学的概念工具应用于分析法律问题和法律干预。这些模型,以及检验它们的实验,都假定了一种无制度的自然状态。在现代社会中,法律的主体从来没有看到过这种自然状态。然而,非正式和正式制度的丰富安排创造了普遍的信任。如果个人有足够的信心,不会发生什么太有害的事情,他们就可以自由地与陌生人互动,就好像他们处于自然状态一样。这种意愿极大地降低了交易成本,促进了劳动分工。如果可以假设普遍信任,那么简单的经济模型是合适的,但它们必须是行为模型,否则个人不会愿意冒互动的风险。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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