What is not mentioned in the famous article by Edmund Gettier

N. Golovko
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Abstract

The paper aims to unfold the «internal» content of Gettier’s argument as a skeptical argument against knowledge in terms of answering the question: «why he could be right when he says what he says». Our initial hypothesis is that E. Gettier does not say anything about the «accidentality of the fact that Smith has 10 coins in his pocket», but he uses the words «entailment» and «deduction», which substantiates the «truth of the conclusion», and on the basis of which he attributes «knowledge» to Smith. The article comes out at a certain time, E. Gettier uses the rhetoric of necessary and sufficient conditions, with regard to justification an analogue of the closure principle is given, there are exactly two examples – all this lead to the assumption that E. Gettier’s «justification» in the form he speaks about it in the staging part of the article – is a logical relationship between beliefs that are interconnected by the relationship of entailment and are fixed in the same way in the person’s belief system. Much of the evidence on pages two and three is an illustration of why this «logical interpretation» of reasoning doesn’t work. Contrary to most popular points of view, E. Gettier managed to show only that the implementation of formal relations between beliefs does not allow one to get to «knowledge» in the form in which he defines it. In particular, such a reading makes it possible to block various attempts to propose a «fourth condition». It must meet the task set – to restore confidence that the fulfillment of the formal relations between beliefs can help to get to «knowledge». However, within the framework of the linguistic turn paradigm, in which E. Gettier works, this is impossible, because in general, it simply lacks adequate means of discussing the persuasiveness of the inference. In this sense, «knowledge» is, by definition, a fuzzy concept that brings us back to «classical notions» in which the persuasiveness of an argument implies not only validity, but also soundness, relevance, and usefulness.
埃德蒙·盖蒂埃那篇著名的文章中没有提到什么
本文旨在通过回答“为什么他说他所说的是正确的”这个问题,来揭示格蒂埃论证作为一种反对知识的怀疑论论证的“内在”内容。我们最初的假设是,E. getier没有说任何关于“史密斯口袋里有10枚硬币这一事实的偶然性”,但他使用了“蕴涵”和“演绎”这两个词,这证实了“结论的真实性”,并在此基础上将“知识”归因于史密斯。文章发表于某一时期,E. Gettier使用了必要和充分条件的修辞,在正当性方面给出了闭包原则的类比;正好有两个例子——所有这些都导致了一个假设,即E. getier的“证明”,以他在文章的阶段部分中所谈到的形式——是信仰之间的逻辑关系,这些信仰通过蕴涵关系相互联系,并以同样的方式固定在人的信仰体系中。第二页和第三页的大部分证据都说明了为什么这种推理的“逻辑解释”不起作用。与大多数流行的观点相反,E. Gettier只是设法表明,信仰之间的形式关系的实现并不允许人们以他所定义的形式获得“知识”。特别是,这样的解读可以阻止提出“第四个条件”的各种尝试。它必须满足设定的任务——恢复信心,即信念之间的形式关系的实现有助于获得“知识”。然而,在E. Gettier工作的语言转向范式的框架内,这是不可能的,因为总的来说,它只是缺乏足够的手段来讨论推理的说服力。在这个意义上,“知识”的定义是一个模糊的概念,它把我们带回到“经典概念”,其中论证的说服力不仅意味着有效性,还意味着合理性、相关性和有用性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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